The Inquiry’s Phase 2 report was released this week, distilling 400 days of evidence and more than three hundred thousand documents. The report concluded the fire which killed 72 people was the culmination of “decades of failure” by government and others in the construction industry. It set out a “path to disaster” stretching back to the early 1990s and criticised organisations at every level. It said companies in the industry were “dishonest” and that all deaths in the fire were “avoidable” and that residents were “badly failed” by those responsible for their safety.Presenter: Kate LambleProducer: Sharon HemansResearcher: May CameronSound Engineer: Hal HainesEditor: Penny Murphy

In the early hours of the 14th of June 2017, a fire broke out in a tower block in West London. This fire was both a personal tragedy and a national scandal.It began in Flat 16 of Grenfell Tower. Before long, the flames reached combustible cladding and insulation, which had been installed on the outside of the building. Less than twenty minutes later, the fire had climbed 19 storeys to the top of the tower, ripping through the flammable materials. The tower was engulfed in flames at a staggering speed. Seventy two people lost their lives, hundreds lost their homes.For the past six years, a public inquiry has been hearing evidence about what lies behind the worst residential fire in UK peacetime in one of the richest areas of the country. Kate Lamble has reported on it since the beginning. And in this series, she tries to understand what created the conditions for a fire which was both foreseeable and preventable.The answer takes us to the heart of how Britain works, from the government and regulation, to business. This is a story of corporate deceit, government deregulation and a construction industry engaged in a race to the bottom. It’s a story of missed opportunities, unheeded warnings and the failure of a state to protect its citizens.

As the sun rises, the local council, the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea are responsible for helping families try and find their loved ones and arranging accommodation for those who have just escaped Grenfell Tower.But as the situation spirals out of control, lost keys, “dehumanising” processes and slow support for residents lead to frustration and confusion.Presenter: Kate Lamble Producer: Josephine Casserly Production coordinator: Janet Staples Audio engineers: James Beard and Gareth Jones Story consultant: Simon Maybin Editor: Penny Murphy

On the top floor of Grenfell Tower, Marcio Gomes and his family are waiting. Outside, the fire has wrapped itself around 3 sides of the building. But Marcio can’t see any of this. He’s relying on the information given to him by 999 call handlers, and they are telling residents they are safest to remain where they are. Marcio has a decision to make: does he wait for firefighters to reach him, or does he take his pregnant wife and daughters into the black void of suffocating smoke that has gathered in front of his door.In this episode, Kate tells the story of the final hours of the fire - of Rania Ibrahim and her daughters and Marcio Gomes and his family.Presenter: Kate Lamble Producer: Josephine Casserly Production coordinator: Janet Staples Audio engineers: James Beard and Gareth Jones Story consultant: Simon Maybin Editor: Penny Murphy

When Ed Daffarn opens his door in the early hours of the morning of the 14th of June 2017, he is confronted by a wall of thick acrid smoke.As the combustible cladding and insulation burned, smoke gathered rapidly in the hallways and stairwells of Grenfell. It prevented many residents from leaving their flats - and ultimately, it is the smoke which killed those who died in the tower.The reason this smoke spread so quickly through the building is due to one small detail, which could easily be considered as inconsequential, but on the night of the fire was far from it.Presenter: Kate Lamble Producer: Josephine Casserly Production coordinator: Janet Staples Audio engineers: James Beard and Gareth Jones Story consultant: Simon Maybin Editor: Penny Murphy

In the early hours of the 14th June 2017, the bell in North Kensington’s fire station begins to ring. Firefighter David Badillo assumes it is a routine house fire. He expects that he and his colleagues will extinguish it quickly and head back to the station.But when he ventures inside the tower, David Badillo realises that this fire is like nothing he’s seen before.In this episode, Kate tells the story of the beginning of the night of the fire and asks whether the firefighters who risked their lives were adequately trained and prepared for an event which, for many, was foreseeable.Presenter: Kate Lamble Producer: Josephine Casserly Production coordinator: Janet Staples Audio engineers: James Beard and Gareth Jones Story consultant: Simon Maybin Editor: Penny Murphy

When Grenfell resident Ed Daffarn first heard about the multimillion pound refurbishment of the tower, he welcomed it. The estate had, in his view, become increasingly run down in recent years.But as the refurbishment progressed, he says residents felt their voices weren’t heard. Meanwhile architects and contractors selected materials which would burn easily in a fire.Kate looks at how cost-cutting and a race to the bottom in the construction industry had devastating consequences for the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower.Presenter: Kate Lamble Producer: Josephine Casserly Production coordinator: Janet Staples Audio engineers: James Beard and Gareth Jones Story consultant: Simon Maybin Editor: Penny Murphy

Why didn't the civil service act on warnings about combustible building materials?You’ve probably not heard of Brian Martin but he’s central to the story of Grenfell. The civil servant responsible for the fire safety section of the building regulation guidance, he has described himself as the “single point of failure”.Kate talks to someone who tried to raise the alarm with him, and asks why he didn’t act on warnings about dangerous cladding.Under the Conservative-Lib Dem coalition government, this was a time of deregulation and cutting red tape. Did these attitudes to health and safety prevent action being taken?Presenter: Kate Lamble Producer: Josephine Casserly Production coordinator: Janet Staples Audio engineers: James Beard and Gareth Jones Story consultant: Simon Maybin Editor: Penny Murphy

A tale of “deliberate and calculated deceit”.Beneath the cladding, a layer of insulation surrounded Grenfell Tower. This too was combustible and on the night of the fire, contributed to how quickly the flames spread. The companies which produced this insulation have been accused of misleading the construction industry about how combustible their products were.In this episode, Kate looks through some of the most jaw-dropping evidence from the public inquiry. Internal emails and company documents expose how insulation companies tested, marketed and sold their flammable products.Presenter: Kate Lamble Producer: Josephine Casserly Production coordinator: Janet Staples Audio engineers: James Beard and Gareth Jones Story consultant: Simon Maybin Editor: Penny Murphy

How manufacturers sold combustible claddingWhen Marcio Gomes found out that Grenfell Tower, where he lived, was going to be covered in cladding, he assumed it must be safe. Today we know this material was the main cause of the spread of the fire at Grenfell Tower.The cladding installed on the tower was made by French company, Arconic - it was highly combustible. Prior to the fire at Grenfell, Arconic staff were warned that covering a tower block in this material could add the fuel power of an oil tanker to the outside walls. Why did they sell it anyway? And how was that allowed?Presenter: Kate Lamble Producer: Josephine Casserly Production coordinator: Janet Staples Audio engineers: James Beard and Gareth Jones Story consultant: Simon Maybin Editor: Penny Murphy

How a fire in Scotland in 1999 foretold the fire at Grenfell Tower.In 1999, a dropped cigarette started a tower block fire in a small town on the west coast of Scotland. The building, which had been recently clad in flammable materials, is said to have caught fire like matchwood. This was one of the first signs that combustible materials were being permitted in the building sector in the UK. These risks were even raised with the New Labour government – so why didn’t they act?How did the UK’s regulations allow for such materials to be used on high rise buildings? And how did government deregulation in the 1980s shape attitudes to health and safety?Presenter: Kate Lamble Producer: Josephine Casserly Production coordinator: Janet Staples Audio engineers: James Beard and Gareth Jones Story consultant: Simon Maybin Editor: Penny Murphy

As the world wakes up to news of a fire in West London, questions start about who’s to blame.At 8.30am on the morning of the 14th of June 2017 Karim Mussilhy is searching for his uncle. It’s over seven hours since the fire started, smoke is still pouring out of the top of Grenfell Tower and a toxic smell is hanging in the air. While residents stare up at the building in shock and Karim scours the streets for his uncle Hesham Rahman, civil servants and ministers also wake up to news of the fire and rush into Whitehall for an emergency meeting. At this moment is the first flicker of recognition that the state may have failed the residents of Grenfell tower – that they hadn’t done what they should have done.Presenter: Kate Lamble Producer: Josephine Casserly Production coordinator: Janet Staples Audio engineers: James Beard and Gareth Jones Story consultant: Simon Maybin Editor: Penny Murphy

In the early hours of the 14th of June 2017, a fire broke out in a tower block in West London. This fire was both a personal tragedy and a national scandal.It began in Flat 16 of Grenfell Tower. Before long, the flames reached combustible cladding and insulation, which had been installed on the outside of the building. Less than twenty minutes later, the fire had climbed 19 storeys to the top of the tower, ripping through the flammable materials. The tower was engulfed in flames at a staggering speed. Seventy two people lost their lives, hundreds lost their homes.For the past six years, a public inquiry has been hearing evidence about what lies behind the worst residential fire in UK peacetime in one of the richest areas of the country. Kate Lamble has reported on it since the beginning. And in this series, she tries to understand what created the conditions for a fire which was both foreseeable and preventable.The answer takes us to the heart of how Britain works, from the government and regulation, to business. This is a story of corporate deceit, government deregulation and a construction industry engaged in a race to the bottom. It’s a story of missed opportunities, unheeded warnings and the failure of a state to protect its citizens.

A new 10-part series about the Grenfell Tower fire and why it happened.As the public inquiry into the fire at Grenfell Tower publishes it’s final report, we’re releasing ten-part series looking into why the fire happened, and how it could have been prevented. For the past six years, a public inquiry has been hearing evidence about what lies behind the worst residential fire in UK peacetime in one of the richest areas of the country. Kate Lamble has reported on it since the beginning. And in this series, she tries to understand what created the conditions for a fire which was both foreseeable and preventable.The answer takes us to the heart of how Britain works, from the government and regulation, to business. This is a story of corporate deceit, government deregulation and a construction industry engaged in a race to the bottom. It’s a story of missed opportunities, unheeded warnings and the failure of a state to protect its citizens.

After more than four years, more than three hundred thousand documents, four hundred days of testimony and around £150 million, the Inquiry heard its final evidence. Lawyers for the core participants put forward the arguments they think the chair of the Inquiry, Sir Martin Moore-Bick, should consider as he produces his final report. Lead Counsel Richard Millett said all the deaths at Grenfell Tower were avoidable and strongly criticised companies and organisations involved in the refurbishment for failing to take responsibility. And Paulos Tekle, a Tower resident, whose five-year-old son lost his life on the night of the fire, tells us what he expects from the final report. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans and Luke Radcliff Researcher: Marcia Veiga Sound Engineer: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

"I can’t undo the past, but I wanted to be a part of making things better” While the Inquiry has paused hearing evidence, Kate Lamble spoke in depth to Nick Hurd, a former Minister for Policing and the Fire Service and now the government’s independent advisor on Grenfell. She asked about his experiences while in government immediately after the fire and discussed what the future holds for the tower itself and how to memorialise the site. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans and Kristiina Cooper Researcher: Marcia Veiga Studio Mix: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

Toxicologist Professor David Purser told the Inquiry that the rapid spread of smoke was the principal cause of death, and that burning cladding panels and insulation were the main source of this poisonous smoke. The Inquiry also heard closing statements for Module 4, covering the immediate aftermath of the fire. From next week it will turn into an inquest, so for this reason the podcast will not be covering those hearings. The podcast will return when the Inquiry produces its final report for the government. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans and Kristiina Cooper Researcher: Marcia Veiga Sound Engineer: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week the inquiry heard closing statements for Module 6, outlining how combustible materials came to be tested, certified and regulated and ended up being installed on the outside walls of Grenfell Tower. Lawyers representing the Bereaved, Survivors and Residents said the Inquiry had exposed fault-lines in the “edifice of government” and another said the “seeds of the Grenfell Tower fire were sown 20 years earlier”. There was criticism of manufacturers, regulators, building control bodies and of the government, with barristers accusing a “cabal of ministers” of being “enslaved to the deregulatory agenda”. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans and Kristiina Cooper Researcher: Marcia Veiga Sound Engineer: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week, as we passed the fifth anniversary of the Grenfell Tower fire, two expert witnesses levelled a series of fierce criticisms at the building safety regime. José Torero, head of the civil engineering department at a London university, described the competence levels among fire safety professionals as “extremely poor” and called for the Stay Put strategy to be abandoned. And Luke Bisby, professor of fire and structures at Edinburgh University, told the Inquiry, that he was “incredulous” at the misuse of fire tests by a cladding firm, and said there was a “significant problem” with the level of competence of fire safety professionals. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans and Kristiina Cooper Researcher: Marcia Veiga Sound Engineer: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week, the Inquiry moved on from examining the aftermath of the fire and began hearing evidence from a series of experts in fire engineering. Luke Bisby, professor of fire and structures at Edinburgh University, described the results of a test on the cladding panels and insulation installed on the tower as the “most shocking experiment” he had ever seen. Barbara Lane, a fire safety expert, told the Inquiry that the culture inside the Building Control sector was of “worrying standards”. And Ivan Stoianov, an expert in water distribution systems, said that the quantity of water available for firefighters at Grenfell was “more than adequate.” Presenter: Sharon Hemans Producers: Kristiina Cooper Researcher: Marcia Veiga Sound Engineer: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week, the Inquiry heard about the confusion, lack of grip and poor communication within Whitehall, as ministers and civil servants dealt with the aftermath of the fire. Nick Hurd was given the initial responsibility for leading the government’s response, despite being only two days into his ministerial position at the time of the Grenfell fire. He described the government’s actions as “wholly inadequate”. A senior civil servant described the local authority's response to residential complaints about housing as a “sign of defensiveness” and the Mayor of London’s chief of staff said that Grenfell residents were “failed by us as a society”. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans and Kristiina Cooper Researcher: Marcia Veiga Sound Engineer: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week, the Inquiry examined how central government responded to the aftermath of the disaster while continuing to hear about London-wide emergency response arrangements. The Chief Executive of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea took two days to ask for emergency help from other London councils, after being “leant on”. An email written by then Prime Minister Theresa May contained damning criticism of RBKC’s response, describing their actions as “utter uselessness”. The British Red Cross said there was confusion over responsibilities between them and the council. Meanwhile this week the government announced that it was rejecting two of the recommendations made by the Inquiry back in 2019. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans and Kristiina Cooper Researcher: Marcia Veiga Sound Engineer: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week, the Inquiry continued to investigate the events immediately after the fire by digging deeper into what happened at local rest centres which were opened to support survivors. An official who volunteered to help with the relief effort described the scene at the largest centre as a shambles, with chaotic scenes, an intimidating armed police presence and a lack of organisation. The authorities tried to send some residents from the walkway flats next to the tower back to their homes, despite them having broken front doors and lacking gas or communal heating. And we heard that at the time of the Grenfell disaster that tower block fires were not included in the official London Risk Register – even though it did mention wildfires and moorland fires. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans and Kristiina Cooper Researcher: Marcia Veiga Sound Engineer: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week we heard different views from senior managers as to how the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea coped in the aftermath of the Grenfell Tower fire. We discovered that the chief executive initially rejected offers of support because he had “great confidence” in the council. And the inquiry heard reports that - on the night after the fire - some residents who had been evacuated from nearby buildings ended up sleeping in their cars or in parks because the council failed to inform them about alternative accommodation. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans and Kristiina Cooper Researcher: Marcia Veiga Sound Engineer: Gareth Jones Editor: Nicola Addyman

The Inquiry continued to hear evidence about the immediate aftermath of the fire. Rebecca Blackburn, a former Contingency Planning Officer for the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, described scenes inside the town hall as “pandemonium”. Her boss told the inquiry he regrets that he didn’t speak up about weaknesses in the council’s emergency plans and accepted he was too late in making some decisions about the response to the disaster. Survivors and relatives described chaotic scenes trying to find information about their loved ones and callousness in their treatment by the council. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans and Kristiina Cooper Researcher: Marcia Veiga Sound Engineer: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week, the Inquiry moved on from the technical discussions of the building regulations and the role of central government to focus on the immediate aftermath of the Grenfell Tower fire. Bereaved, survivors and relatives gave emotional evidence about their experiences directly after the disaster, saying they were “treated like criminals” with the authorities apparently most concerned about the possibility of rioting. They struggled to find officials on the ground in the hours after the disaster and there was little if any information available about who had died and who had survived. Many said they received poor support, including grossly unsuitable accommodation, causing more trauma. The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea admitted to numerous failings including in communication, accommodation and training. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans and Kristiina Cooper Researcher: Marcia Veiga Sound Engineer: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week, three politicians gave evidence. Eric Pickles, former housing secretary, told the Inquiry that he could not understand how the government’s deregulation agenda could have discouraged civil servants from tightening fire safety standards, describing this as “inexplicable and unjust”. Stephen Williams, the minister responsible for implementing the coroner’s recommendations after a previous tower block fire, admitted he had never read the coroner's original letter. And former minister Gavin Barwell told the Inquiry that his private office didn’t receive key information.       Presenter: Kate Lamble     Producers: Sharon Hemans, Kristiina Cooper & Ben Henderson    Researcher: Marcia Veiga     Sound Engineer: Gareth Jones      Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week, civil servant Brian Martin completed his evidence after more than seven days. In his concluding evidence, he said that there were several occasions on which he believed he could have prevented the Grenfell Tower fire from happening. And – almost five years on – politicians appeared for the first time. Two former ministers with responsibility for fire safety, Brandon Lewis and Lord James Wharton gave evidence – following calls to ‘bear the brunt of the blame’ – to explain their decisions and policies. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans and Kristiina Cooper Researcher: Marcia Veiga Sound Engineer: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week, senior civil servant Brian Martin continued giving evidence to the Inquiry. As the only person to testify with experience working for both the Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government and the Building Research Establishment, the Inquiry learnt about the intricacies and inadequacies of his role overseeing building regulations guidance. He conceded that he had underestimated the risks posed by cladding used on high-rise buildings like Grenfell Tower, and that he had lulled his peers into a false sense of security over the dangers. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans, Kristiina Cooper and Nathan Gower Researcher: Marcia Veiga Studio Mix: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week, the Inquiry heard from three senior civil servants: Dame Melanie Dawes, the former permanent secretary at the Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government, said that she had not been informed about the risk of combustible insulation on high-rise buildings and conceded that the department had systemic failings. Brian Martin, a significant figure who was responsible for the fire safety section of the building regulation guidance, denied accusations of an information “cover up”. Louise Upton, who oversaw fire safety policy, was pressed on why she had resisted mandatory certification for fire risk assessors. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans and Kristiina Cooper Researcher: Marcia Veiga Studio Mix: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week, the Inquiry heard about the work culture in the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government and how Richard Harral, the Head of Technical Policy, was left feeling angry, frustrated and so “deeply ashamed” that he quit three years into the role. The Inquiry also heard from Sir Ken Knight, the government’s former Chief Fire and Rescue Advisor, who was asked why he didn’t react sooner to a tower block fire in 2009. And Dennis Davis, the Executive Officer of the Fire Sector Federation, concluded that “fire safety is often perceived as a burden”. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans and Kristiina Cooper Researcher: Marcia Veiga Studio Mix: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week the Inquiry heard from inside Whitehall, as two civil servants, Bob Ledsome and Anthony Burd, gave evidence. It was revealed that the All-Party Parliamentary Group on fire safety chased housing ministers 16 times about a promised revision to the building regulation guidance. And we heard about a briefing that was prepared a few days after the Grenfell Tower Fire, which described the department’s correspondence with this group as “appalling, delayed, partial and looks chaotic”. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans and Kristiina Cooper Researcher: Marcia Veiga Studio Mix: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week, the Inquiry heard from Debbie Smith, a senior figure in the Building Research Establishment for more than 34 years. She failed to speak up at a meeting with the government two days after the Grenfell Tower fire about the “immediate and present risk to life” ACM panels on buildings over 18 metres presented. And there was a significant milestone, as Anthony Burd, a former senior civil servant, became the first government figure to appear. Presenter: Sharon Hemans Producers: Nathan Gower and Kristiina Cooper Researcher: Marcia Veiga Studio Mix: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week the Inquiry heard that cladding similar to that installed on Grenfell Tower underwent a “catastrophic” fire test 16 years earlier. Sarah Colwell, Director of Fire Suppression Testing and Certification for the Building Research Establishment (BRE), described the speed of flame spread as “shocking”. We also heard that the BRE failed to alert the industry about widespread and potentially dangerous misinterpretations of building regulation guidance. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Nathan Gower and Sharon Hemans Researchers: Ben Henderson and Marcia Veiga Studio Mix: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week, David Crowder, former Head of Investigation at the Building Research Establishment, told the Inquiry that an investigation into the Lakanal House fire in 2009, was shut down by the Government although it was “fundamentally incomplete”. David Metcalf, the Director of Window and Cladding Technology, explained how confusion over the use of the word “filler” in building regulation guidance created a “huge problem”, with insulation materials not meeting standards of limited combustibility. The Inquiry also heard from Lorraine Turner, Accreditation Director at United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS), who acknowledged there were shortcomings in UKAS’ assessments of bodies within the construction industry. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Nathan Gower and Sharon Hemans Researchers: Ben Henderson and Marcia Veiga Studio Mix: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week, the Inquiry heard how the National House Building Council (NHBC) approved Kingspan’s combustible cladding insulation for many years. John Lewis, a fire engineer at the NHBC, admitted that a desire to collaborate with industry was a “corrupting” influence on their actions. It was also revealed that two days after the Grenfell fire, a senior civil servant asked the NHBC to support in public the government’s assertion that Grenfell Tower’s cladding was not permitted in the UK. Diane Marshall, who held final responsibility for approving building materials at NHBC, repeatedly defended the institution’s actions. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producer: Nathan Gower Researcher: Ben Henderson Studio Mix: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week we heard closing statements for two modules of the inquiry on firefighting. Lawyers for the London Fire Brigade (LFB) and those representing the Bereaved, Survivors, and Residents (BSRs) strongly disagreed over the responsibility of the LFB for the failure to arrange an early evacuation of Grenfell Tower. The lawyer representing one of the BSR groups, Leslie Thomas, proposed a “Hillsborough Law” to require a duty of candour from those giving evidence. We interviewed Pete Weatherby QC, who represented BSRs during the first phase of the Grenfell Inquiry, and worked on the Hillsborough disaster inquest. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans, Nathan Gower Researcher: Ben Henderson Studio Mix: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week the Inquiry questioned representatives from both the National House Building Council and Local Authority Building Control about the steps they took to restrict or approve the use of combustible materials in the years before the Grenfell Tower fire. Steve Evans, an NHBC manager, was warned at a conference 18 months before the Grenfell fire about the dangers of the combustible cladding which would eventually be installed on the tower. The former Technical Sales Director of the LABC, David Ewing, told the inquiry the company was gamed and played by insulation manufacturers. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans and Nathan Gower Researcher: Ben Henderson Studio Mix: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week the Inquiry turned its attention to how building regulations were set and combustible materials tested and certified. Lawyers for the bereaved, survivors, and residents accused the government of concealing crucial information from previous fires, and industry bodies of knowingly approving unsafe building materials. Barry Turner, the former Director of Technical Policy at the Local Authority Building Control (LABC), agreed that his organisation’s close relationship with insulation manufacturer, Kingspan, affected their response when questions were raised about the fire performance of Kingspan’s K15 insulation. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans, Nathan Gower Researcher: Ben Henderson Studio Mix: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

Andy Roe, Commissioner of the London Fire Brigade, made a series of frank admissions this week. He said the LFB was aware of every single problem that contributed to the Grenfell Tower fire in advance of the night. A former LFB Commissioner, Ron Dobson, also gave evidence. He answered questions on why some of the recommendations that the Brigade committed to after the 2009 Lakanal House fire weren’t addressed. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans, Nathan Gower Researcher: Ben Henderson Studio Mix: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week evidence was presented by former London Fire Brigade Commissioner Dany Cotton, who previously told the Inquiry that the LFB could not have prepared for a fire like Grenfell Tower. This time, she conceded that in the years leading up to the fire, the LFB failed to take on board national guidance that warned how combustible cladding could lead to rapid fire spread, as it did at Grenfell. Evidence was also provided by another former LFB Commissioner, Ron Dobson. We heard how LFB Incident Commander training fell short of commitments they made in light of the 2009 Lakanal House fire. David Brown, former LFB Director of Operations, continued his evidence from last week covering the training of Control Room staff. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans, Nathan Gower Researcher: Ben Henderson Studio Mix: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week the Inquiry continued to look at how the London Fire Brigade (LFB) trained its Control Room staff to deal with emergency calls. Evidence was provided by Joanne Smith, the Senior Operations Manager in the Control Room on the night of the Grenfell fire, and Tom George, former Assistant Commissioner for Operational Response accountable for staff training. The Inquiry heard how the LFB’s training on emergency calls didn’t include guidance on asking callers if they had any mobility issues. And a senior manager admitted she was embarrassed by the lack of clarity in the training. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans & Nathan Gower Researcher: Ben Henderson Studio Mix: Gareth Jones Editor: Nicola Addyman

This week the Inquiry looked at how the London Fire Brigade (LFB) trained its Control Room staff to deal with emergency calls. Evidence was given by Scott Hayward, former LFB Principal Operations Manager, and Joanne Smith, the Senior Operations Manager in the Control Room on the night of the Grenfell fire. The Inquiry heard how leading up to Grenfell there were a series of failures to improve the training of Control Room staff, despite commitments to learn the lessons of a fatal fire in a tower block in 2009. Presenter: Tom Symonds; Producers: Sharon Hemans, May Cameron and Nathan Gower; Researcher: Ben Henderson; Studio Mix: Gareth Jones; Editor: Hugh Levinson

This week the Inquiry focused on the London Fire Brigade’s firefighting policies for high-rise buildings. Peter Cowup – former Assistant Commissioner of the LFB’s Operational Policy Department, and Patrick Utting from the LFB’s Operational Policy Team told the Inquiry how the LFB updated their policies in light of fires in South London in 2009 and Southampton in 2010. Presenter: Tom Symonds; Producers: Sharon Hemans, May Cameron and Nathan Gower; Researcher: Ben Henderson; Studio Mix: Gareth Jones; Editor: Jasper Corbett

This week the inquiry saw the closing of one module and the beginning of another. The opening statements for module six looked at how local and national policies guided the work of firefighters on the night of the fire. In the closing statements for module three, we heard about how the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea and the Tenant Management Organisation carried out their duties regarding Grenfell Tower. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researchers: May Cameron and Nathan Gower Studio Mix: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

The inquiry heard evidence from expert witnesses on the London Fire Brigade’s preparedness for the Grenfell Tower fire. Fire safety expert Professor Jose Torero argued that the LFB lacked the technical knowledge which would have allowed them to understand how the fire was behaving. The inquiry also heard from expert witness Chris McGuirk on the LFB’s information gathering policies, and from Professor Chris Johnson on radio communications. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researchers: May Cameron and Nathan Gower Studio Mix: Gareth Jones Editor: Hugh Levinson

Paul Grimwood, a fire engineer at Kent Fire and Rescue Service, developed an alternative approach to firefighting in high rise buildings in 2008. The approach allowed incident commanders to assess which of four firefighting strategies - rescue, intervention, containment or evacuation - should be prioritised. Lawyers from the bereaved, survivors and residents of Grenfell Tower have questioned why the London Fire Brigade did not do the same. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans and May Cameron Researcher: Nathan Gower Studio Mix: Gareth Jones

This week we learned that a member of the London Fire Brigade’s Fire Safety Team wrote that giving advice on the risks of high rise cladding fires could be the ‘cat out of the bag on this issue’. The inquiry also heard evidence from the LFB’s former director of operations. Dan Brown said that at the time of the Grenfell Tower fire more than 5,000 high rise buildings were not present on the brigade’s operational risk database. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Producer: Chloe Hadjimatheou Studio Mix: Gareth Jones

The “uncontrolled spread of fire across the outside of tall buildings is a significant threat”. The inquiry revealed that weeks before the fire at Grenfell Tower LFB staff wrote a presentation which warned of the risks of façade fires weeks. The inquiry heard evidence from a Deputy Commissioner, Director of Operational Resilience and Training, and Assistant Commissioner and Head of Fire Safety. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researchers: May Cameron and Nathan Gower Studio Mix: Gareth Jones

“The simple fact is that the LFB did know. They knew, and lives could and should have been saved”. This week the inquiry heard new evidence about the management of the LFB and how it trained its staff ahead of the Grenfell Tower fire. A lawyer representing a group of the bereaved, survivors and residents said his clients did not want heroes in the LFB, “but well trained professionals working to a well-structured plan”. The LFB’s former deputy commissioner revealed the government failed to act when the LFB asked it to warn councils about the risks of cladding in 2009, more than seven years before the Grenfell Tower fire. And the brigade’s former head of development and training answered questions about what lessons the LFB had learned from previous fires. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researcher: May Cameron Studio Mix: Gareth Jones

“Truly a case of donkeys led by donkeys”. This was how a lawyer for a group of the bereaved, survivors and residents described lead contractor Rydon, the firm of architects Studio E and specialist cladding contractor, Harley Facades. Core participants submitted closing statements, marking the end of the first two sections of Phase 2 of the inquiry which heard evidence about the refurbishment of the tower which put combustible materials on the external walls of the tower. Producer / Presenter: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researcher: May Cameron Studio Mix: Graham Puddifoot

“Professionally reckless behaviour”. Expert witness Barbara Lane gave evidence on the fire risk assessments carried out at Grenfell Tower. She described the fire risk assessor’s behaviour as ‘reckless’ for signing off the building’s cladding as safe without evidence. She also deemed it ‘not acceptable’ that residents with disabilities weren’t identified. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producers: Sharon Hemans and Ben Carter Researcher: May Cameron Studio Mix: Gareth Jones Editor: Jasper Corbett

“An necessary tragedy”. The inquiry revealed the Local Government Association was warned in 2011 that its failure to recommend evacuation plans for residents with disabilities could lead to an ‘unnecessary tragedy’. Expert witness Colin Todd gave evidence on the work of fire risk assessor Carl Stokes and answered questions about guidance he helped draw up. The inquiry’s expert witness on building control Beryl Menzies examined the role the council’s building control department had played signing off the smoke ventilation system at Grenfell Tower. Abigail Acosta, a Project Manager at the TMO, also gave evidence. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researcher: May Cameron Studio Mix: Gareth Jones

Expert witness Roger Howkins concluded the inquiry’s examination into the lifts at Grenfell Tower. Contractors who worked on the lifts and a former engineer from the Tenant Management Organisation also gave evidence. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researcher: May Cameron Studio Mix: Gareth Jones

“That culture possibly needs to change”. Gas safety expert Rodney Hancox concluded the design of the gas pipes installed on Grenfell Tower did not comply with building regulations. Staff from the contractor involved in installing the gas pipes accepted the company failed to identify safety hazards. The inquiry also heard evidence from lift consultants Butler & Young. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researcher: May Cameron Studio Mix: Gareth Jones

The smoke ventilation system installed at Grenfell Tower as part of the refurbishment did not comply with building regulation guidance. The designer of the system, Hugh Mahoney, told the inquiry he did not think any system could be compliant. Presenter & Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researcher: Luke Radcliff Studio Mix: Gareth Jones

The smoke ventilation system was “another story of incompetence and indifference” according to a lawyer representing a group of bereaved, survivors and residents. Building Control fire regulations expert Paul Hanson from the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea was asked whether he’d given proper scrutiny to plans for the smoke ventilation system in Grenfell Tower. Legal representatives for some bereaved and survivors claimed that some parts used were of the lowest possible quality, something the system designer denied. Meanwhile Tenant Management Organisation Chief Executive Robert Black and Repairs Direct boss Graham Webb faced questions over the fitting and maintenance of fire doors. Presenter & Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Editor: Jasper Corbett Studio Mix: Gareth Jones

“An exercise in concealment and half-truth”. Senior management at the Tenant Management Organisation answered questions about the TMO’s fire safety management systems in the lead up to the fire at Grenfell Tower. The Chief Executive Robert Black said he understood why some residents had reason to lose trust in the organisation. An LFB officer said he thought the TMO was “economical with the truth”. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researcher: May Cameron Studio Mix: Gareth Jones

“He may not be competent for his role”. The LFB raised concerns with the TMO’s Health and Safety and Facilities Manager about the competency of the fire risk assessor at Grenfell Tower. Witnesses from the LFB told the inquiry why they had concerns about Carl Stokes. Two caretakers at the TMO also gave evidence. Presenter / Producer: Sharon Hemans Producer: Luke Radcliff Researcher: May Cameron Studio Mix: Gareth Jones

Today marks four years since the fire at Grenfell Tower. We spoke to former resident Antonio Roncolato. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producer: May Cameron Studio Mix: James Beard

“It was clearly a major oversight. I can’t give you any other explanation, I’m sorry.” The Health and Safety and Facilities Manager at the Tenant Management Organisation admitted it was a ‘major oversight’ not sharing information of vulnerable residents with the fire risk assessor at Grenfell Tower. She described feeling ‘spread thin’ in her role at the TMO, lacking resources and staff. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Luke Radcliff Researcher: May Cameron Studio Mix: Gareth Jones

“I believe that I undertook the risk assessments to the best of my ability”. The fire risk assessor Carl Stokes gave his final day of evidence at the inquiry. It emerged he had told the organisation which ran Grenfell Tower that the cladding installed on the building met regulations – despite doing no investigations of his own. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researcher: May Cameron

“Is that not a very incurious approach for a fire risk assessor?”. Carl Stokes was the fire risk assessor responsible for carrying out checks on Grenfell Tower from 2009 to 2017. Part of his job was to check doors; many flat entrance doors did not have self-closing mechanisms at the time of the fire. The inquiry heard how Carl Stokes copied and pasted information across different fire risk assessments. He accepted they contained mistakes because he did not read what he signed off. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researcher: May Cameron Studio Mix: Gareth Jones

“I think we lacked a little humanity”. The inquiry heard from elected councillors at the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. Councillor Quentin Marshall said the council “could have done better” after it emerged he sent an email saying he was “not massively sympathetic to general ‘it’s all terrible’ complaints” about the refurbishment works at Grenfell tower. Leader of RBKC Nick Paget-Brown and Councillors Rock Feilding-Mellen, Sam Mackover and Judith Blakeman also gave evidence. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researcher: May Cameron Studio Mix: Gareth Jones

“Getting out of this building by the stairs is extremely difficult”. The Director of Housing, the Executive Director of Operations and the Head of Housing Commissioning at the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea gave evidence. The inquiry heard how some recommendations after another high rise cladding fire weren’t implemented, and that the council did not collect data on how the Tenant Management Organisation, which ran Grenfell Tower, performed in terms of fire safety. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researcher: May Cameron

‘Stay put’ was relied on despite evacuations after fires in other TMO properties. The TMO’s Peter Maddison and Teresa Brown were questioned about the organisation’s relationship with residents and why no personal emergency evacuation plans were drawn up for residents with disabilities. Expert witness Jonathan Sakula told the inquiry the dangers of using combustible cladding on high rise buildings were widely known in the construction industry after a number of cladding fires around the world. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researcher: May Cameron

‘Let’s hope our luck holds out and there are no fires in the meantime’. Staff from the Tenant Management Organisation, which managed Grenfell Tower, returned to give evidence at the inquiry. The TMO’s Peter Maddison and Claire Williams were asked why important fire safety measures, such as smoke vents and self-closing fire doors, were left broken or non-compliant for significant periods of time. Two other TMO staff, Siobhan Rumble and Nicola Bartholomew, both said they never discussed evacuation plans for residents with disabilities because the building had a ‘stay put’ policy. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researcher: May Cameron

‘They didn’t treat us with respect or humanity or empathy and if they had done, we wouldn’t be sitting here now’. Former residents of Grenfell Tower described how the Tenant Management Organisation ran the building. One of the main campaigners for safety at Grenfell Tower, Edward Daffarn, repeatedly questioned fire safety matters within the building and residents with disabilities described being given no instruction about fire safety. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researcher: May Cameron Studio Mix: Gareth Jones

This week the inquiry will hear evidence from residents, the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea and the Tenant Management Organisation. Groups affiliated to the bereaved, survivors and residents have called for the inquiry to investigate the role race and class played at Grenfell. In this episode relatives of residents who lived in the tower explain why they think it's important for the inquiry to explore whether discrimination and class played a role in the deaths of their loved ones. Presenter / Producer: Sharon Hemans Studio Mix: Gareth Jones

Grenfell Tower ‘a landmark act of discrimination against disabled and vulnerable people’. The inquiry was presented with opening statements for Module 3 of the inquiry. This section will examine the management of Grenfell Tower, including the fire risk assessments carried out and how residents’ complaints were dealt with. Legal representatives for the bereaved, survivors and residents of Grenfell Tower said resident involvement in the refurbishment of the building was ‘tokenistic’ and accused the person who carried out the fire risk assessment on the tower of inventing qualifications. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researcher: May Cameron Studio Mix: Gareth Jones

‘Would it be fair… to say that you were set up by others …as Kingspan’s useful idiot’? Kingspan Insulation’s Managing Director Richard Burnley gave evidence this week. Questioned about Kingspan’s conduct after the fire at Grenfell Tower when it held a private meeting to lobby MPs, Richard Burnley denied the company accessed political power for its own commercial gain. The British Board of Agrement also gave evidence. The BBA’s Senior Technical Manager John Albon, denied that the BBA was ‘toothless and weak’, but admitted it had supported inaccurate claims from manufacturers. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researcher: May Cameron Studio Mix: Gareth Jones

A safety certificate for insulation installed on Grenfell Tower contained a ‘very basic failure of due diligence’. In 2008 the independent organisation, the British Board of Agrement produced a certificate for a combustible plastic foam insulation made by the company Kingspan. The product - Kooltherm K15 - was later installed on Grenfell Tower. The inquiry heard from staff at the BBA involved in certifying Kooltherm K15. The certificate stated that the product achieved a British fire standard without the BBA ever requesting any fire tests proving the product had actually achieved this. BBA staff were also questioned about how they issued certificates for the combustible cladding panels used on Grenfell Tower. One employee accepted the organisation had published a certificate that was ‘materially wrong’. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researcher: May Cameron Studio Mix: Gareth Jones

“What will happen if only one building made out [of] PE core is on fire and will kill 60 to 70 persons”. Arconic, the company which made the combustible cladding installed on Grenfell Tower was warned of the risk of a building fire that could kill “60 to 70” people, a decade before the tragedy. Three of Arconic’s witnesses have refused to give evidence at the inquiry. Lead Counsel to the inquiry Richard Millett presented some of the documents and questions he would have covered had they attended. Witnesses from the cavity barrier manufacturer Siderise, the British Board of Agrement, and insulation panel manufacturer Panel Systems were also questioned. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researcher: May Cameron Studio Mix: Gareth Jones

A manager at the BRE accepted he made a fundamental omission when analysing test data. Tony Baker told the inquiry he failed to notice non-combustible magnesium oxide boards used in a test by the insulation manufacturer Celotex. The inquiry also heard from David Jones of Herefordshire Building Control who produced a certificate which incorrectly stated Kingspan insulation was a material of ‘limited combustibility’. This is the standard suggested for use on buildings over 18 metres in height. He admitted taking information at ‘face value’ but told the inquiry he was misled by Kingspan. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researcher: May Cameron Studio Mix: Gareth Jones

A manager at the BRE denied deliberately concealing test evidence. Phil Clark managed the burn hall where fire safety tests were carried out. He told the inquiry he failed to notice that a test rig for an insulation product used on Grenfell Tower had been altered to increase its chances of passing. Non-combustible magnesium oxide boards had been added to the test but were not mentioned in the BRE’s test report. Claude Schmidt, the President of Arconic Architectural Products, continued his evidence and accepted the use of the cladding panels installed on Grenfell Tower was an ‘accident waiting to happen’. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researcher: May Cameron Studio Mix: Gareth Jones

The cladding manufacturer admitted it had been ‘deliberately and dishonestly misleading’. Claude Schmidt, the President of Arconic Architectural Products, answered questions about the testing, classification and performance of the cladding panels used on Grenfell Tower – which the inquiry has established was the main cause of the spread of the 2017 fire. The cladding panels came in two different shapes - either cassette or rivet - each shape performing differently when exposed to fire. The inquiry heard that when the cassette panels ‘disastrously’ failed a fire test, the test results were not shared with certification bodies or customers. The cassette shaped cladding panels were used on Grenfell Tower. Claude Schmidt accepted that this was misleading, but denied deliberately withholding information and risking life safety. The inquiry also heard that Claude Wehrle, head of the technical sales support team, told his colleagues that the failed fire safety test should be kept ‘very confidential’. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researcher: May Cameron

The inquiry returned this week with evidence from the cladding manufacturer, Arconic. UK Sales Managers Deborah French admitted she had not read building regulation guidance on cladding installed on buildings over 18 metres. She also said that for reasons of cost Arconic continued to sell cladding panels with a combustible core after a number of high profile fires. Evidence also showed that Arconic provided its clients with outdated classification certificates for its cladding panels. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researcher: May Cameron

The inquiry pauses for a few weeks because of the pandemic

The inquiry heard how technical staff from the insulation manufacturer Kingspan joked that claims about the fire performance of its insulation product – Kooltherm K15 - were “all lies” and the product should be scrapped. Kingspan also hired a PR consultancy firm to help it lobby MPs who were deciding the future of building regulations just six weeks after the fire at Grenfell Tower. Emails also showed that to help justify the sale of Kingspan’s combustible insulation on buildings over 18 metres in height, Kingspan carried out a test with a non-combustible insulation deliberately designing it to perform poorly. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researcher: May Cameron

The inquiry heard more evidence from insulation manufacturers Kingspan. Three of the company’s managers were questioned about their involvement in the testing and marketing of the company’s combustible insulation. The company’s Technical Manager said a contractor who had concerns about the use of Kingspan’s insulation had confused him “with someone who gives a damn”. The inquiry also revealed that an official in the Department for Communities and Local Government knew about the risks of using combustible insulation on high rises as early as 2014 – three years before the fire at Grenfell Tower. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researcher: May Cameron

Former staff from Kingspan, the manufacturer of an insulation product used on Grenfell Tower gave evidence this week. Technical Project Lead Ivor Meredith, admitted he was involved in a deliberate calculated deceit carried out by the company – aimed at achieving the best possible sales for its insulation products. Only a month ago Kingspan withdrew three large scale fire test reports after accepting the product tested did not represent what they were selling. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researcher: May Cameron

Former staff from the insulation manufacturer Celotex admitted that they behaved unethically dishonestly and lied for commercial gain during their work to get a product approved for use on buildings over 18 metres in height. They admitted they adding a non-combustible material called magnesium oxide to ensure their cladding system passed a fire test and then hid details of that test from certification bodies, customers and even their own staff. Producer / Presenter: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researcher: May Cameron

The Module 2 opening statements concluded as the cladding manufacturers were accused of abusing their products’ testing and certification processes. Sam Stein, who represents a group of bereaved, survivors and and residents, said the panel “may well come to the conclusion that the manufacturers, Arconic, Kingspan, and Celotex are little more than crooks and killers.” They outlined how they say the manufacturers set out to manipulate fire performance tests, resulting in unsafe products being sold for use on high rise buildings like Grenfell Tower. Staff from Celotex, which made the insulation used on the tower, said they were under pressure to raise the company’s profits by bringing a new product to the market. They admitted their marketing material was potentially misleading. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researcher: Luke Radcliff

Opening statements of Module 2 of the inquiry. The companies which manufactured the insulation and cladding products used on Grenfell Tower were accused of ‘sinister’ behaviour to distort fire tests conducted on their materials so that their products could be used on high rise residential buildings. Module 2 of the inquiry will examine how materials used on the tower were tested, approved, advertised and sold. Stephanie Barwise who represents a group of bereaved, survivors and residents argued that manufacturers knew that the products they were selling were dangerous, yet failed to be candid with organisations which issued official classification certificates, instead viewing them as ‘mere marketing tools’ Expert witness Paul Hyett, charged with investigating the work of architects Studio E, also gave evidence to the inquiry this week. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researcher: May Cameron

The TMO conclude their evidence and the inquiry hears from expert witnesses Dr Barbara Lane & Beryl Menzies. Peter Maddison, former Director of Assets and Regeneration at the Kensington and Chelsea TMO said he knew meeting contractor Rydon before the conclusion of the tender process was a commercial risk but one worth taking. He also faced questions on the late submission of his diaries and notebooks. Expert witness Beryl Menzies stated that RBKC Building Control made a fundamental failure by not asking for more details about the cladding material. And expert witness Dr Barbara Lane said fire safety consultants Exova’s failure to analyse the cladding proposals amounted to professional negligence. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researcher: Luke Radcliff Editor: Hugh Levinson

In October 2019 the Inquiry published its Phase 1 report, and as part of that, the chair of the Inquiry Sir Martin Moore-Bick, made 46 recommendations. They were directed at the government, the London Fire Brigade, fire and rescue and emergency services around the country, as well as landlords and managers of high rise residential buildings. To help us understand what progress has been made implementing the recommendations over the last 12 months we spoke with two experts in the industry; approved inspector Geoff Wilkinson and fire safety consultant Phil Murphy. One recommendation in particular, Personal Emergency Evacuation Plans for vulnerable residents living in high rise buildings, looks unlikely to be implemented in full. Shahrokh Aghlani explains his family’s legal case to try and ensure this recommendation is applied in full. Presenter: Kate Lamble Producer: May Cameron

There was a surprising start to the week when it was revealed the TMO's Director of Assets and Regeneration, Peter Maddison, failed to submit evidence to the Inquiry until four days before he was due to be questioned.  It also emerged that Claire Williams from the TMO had ‘binned’ notebooks from her time working on the project. Peter Maddison admitted talking to the main contractor Rydon about saving £800,000 from the project costs, before the formal results of the tender process were announced. The inquiry heard how Claire Williams asked the main contractor for details of the fire performance of the cladding system several times. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Luke Radcliff Researcher: May Cameron

Staff from the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea’s Tenant Management Organisation, which ran Grenfell Tower, gave evidence this week. The Inquiry heard that the TMO broke European procurement rules; they admitted they had secret meetings to discuss savings on the refurbishment and asked the architects Studio E to limit their fees in order to reduce competition in the tender process. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researcher: May Cameron

Simon Cash, the Grenfell Tower Project Director at Artelia, told the Inquiry he felt uncomfortable about how part of the project’s tender process to employ a design and build contractor was carried out. He said he was not aware that Rydon, the main contractor, had been told they were in pole position to win the tender before the tender interviews had taken place. Neil Reed, also from Artelia, told the Inquiry that he thought some of Rydon’s work on the refurbishment was poor. The Inquiry also heard evidence from John Allen, head of Building Control at the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. John Allen denied there was a culture of bullying in the Building Control department. He thought John Hoban, who gave evidence last week, had adequate support. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researcher: May Cameron

Evidence at the Inquiry this week was dominated by the first witness from the building control department at the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. John Hoban was the building control surveyor responsible for the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower. He told the Inquiry he was overworked due to funding cuts at the local council. He said he knew nothing at the time about the fire performance of the combustible core to the panels, and that he did not notice incorrectly installed cavity barriers. He admitted that this was below the standard of a reasonably competent building control surveyor. Installers of the cladding, Osborne Berry, admitted that some of their workmanship such as the incorrectly installed cavity barriers was unacceptable. The Inquiry also heard from Mark Dixon, Director of SD Plastering, responsible for installing the uPVC window surrounds. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researcher: May Cameron

The Inquiry started this week with evidence from Ben Bailey, Project Manager for cladding specialists Harley Facades. In his mid-twenties at the time, he described how he changed the insulation material used and only carried out site inspections on three sides of the tower. Jonathan White, a Clerk of Works, told the Inquiry he thought it was his job to check work on the refurbishment was presentable but that it was for building control to check the building complied with regulations. The Sales Director at the cladding manufacturers CEP - Geof Blades, said he had limited knowledge of what the materials he sold were made of and that he did not check if the design met the building regulations. Andrew McQuatt, the Project Engineer with Max Fordham suggested insulation for use on Grenfell Tower. He told the Inquiry he did not know it had the potential to be so unsafe. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researcher: May Cameron

Staff from cladding specialists Harley Facades gave their second week of evidence with some contradictions The freelance designer hired to do the detailed design work on the cladding told the inquiry he knew building regulation guidance suggested cavity barriers were necessary around windows. But these never appeared in drawings. The Design Manager said he didn’t consider it his responsibility to check whether the drawings complied with building regulations. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researcher: May Cameron

Harley’s Managing Director, Ray Bailey denied that his company put pressure on the architects Studio E to use combustible cladding materials on Grenfell. Ray Bailey said he thought the materials used on the tower complied with building regulation guidance, which he found confusing. In other evidence Zak Maynard, a Managing Surveyor for Rydon, admitted the main contractor downgraded materials around the windows of the tower due to an estimating error. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researcher: May Cameron

Rydon knew they were in ‘pole position’ to win the tender for the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower, before the formal tender process had ended, according to evidence given to the inquiry. The Refurbishment Manager agreed in his evidence that Rydon had personal and private access to staff at the Tenant Management Organisation. The tender document gave inaccurate information in the CVs of key staff. Rydon passed on incorrect figures to the TMO about potential savings from changing materials. Two site managers working on the refurbishment said that they had not checked the fire safety of the materials used to clad the exterior. One site manager, Daniel Osgood, was described by a senior colleague as “a chancer” who tried to do as little work as possible. Another site manager gave evidence about the installation of the windows, which along with the cladding played a significant role in the spread of flame on the night of the fire. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researcher: May Cameron Contact us via email: [email protected]

The Inquiry heard a full week of evidence from Rydon, the lead contractor in the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower. The Inquiry heard how Rydon relied on specialist subcontractors to raise safety concerns. Emails described some residents unhappy with the building work as ‘rebels’. And there was evidence which showed how Rydon underreported potential savings to make up for their own budgeting shortfall. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researcher: May Cameron Contact us via email: [email protected]

The inquiry heard evidence from three of the companies involved in the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower. The consultant who reviewed the fire safety strategy said he was unaware that the works included overcladding, and no-one working for the contractor Rydon had the experience to check whether materials used in the refurbishment complied with building regulations.

This week the fire consultants Exova gave more evidence. The Inquiry heard how no fire strategy report was ever completed for Grenfell Tower, and that their last version of the report suggested the proposed changes would have no adverse effect on the risks of external fire spread. The Inquiry also heard that the lead consultant working on the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower said he was unaware of any of the materials designers were planning to use on the building, but was sent details of the materials in email attachments he did not read. Presenter / Producer: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researcher: May Cameron Contacts us via email: [email protected]

More than three years after the fire at Grenfell tower, hundreds of buildings around the country are still covered in ACM – the same type of cladding used at Grenfell. As Phase 2 of the inquiry restarts after a four month break, we hear from residents who have been living in buildings with combustible cladding. Producer / Presenter: Kate Lamble Producer: Sharon Hemans Researcher: May Cameron

This week Cate Cooney, a former employee of the fire safety consultancy Exova gave her evidence, before the inquiry was suspended due to the outbreak of Covid-19. The fire safety strategy for the existing building was written by a consultant who never visited the site. It decided that a number of features which didn’t meet current building regulations were ‘satisfactory’. Presenter / producer : Kate Lamble Producer: Luke Radcliff Researcher: May Cameron Contact us via email: [email protected]

This week the architects Studio E gave more evidence. The Inquiry heard how the materials used in the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower were chosen and how some of the design features were selected. Witnesses said the initial selection of the combustible cladding was based on appearance and price, and blamed what they called misleading marketing material for their choice of insulation. Presenter / Producer : Kate Lamble Producer: Luke Radcliff Researcher: May Cameron Contact us via email: [email protected]

The architectural company which designed the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower started their evidence this week. The Inquiry heard how none of the initial team working on the project had any experience in cladding high rise residential buildings, and that the lead architect was not familiar with specific regulations for high rise buildings. Presenter / producer : Kate Lamble Producer: Luke Radcliff Researcher: May Cameron Contact us via email: [email protected]

A legal discussion about whether to offer blanket protection from self-incrimination put the Inquiry on hold this week. We look into what this really means, and explain how building regulations work in England. Presenter / producer : Kate Lamble Producer: Luke Radcliff Researcher: May Cameron Contact us via email: [email protected]

The opening statements of Phase 2 of the inquiry Phase 2 of the inquiry started by looking at the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower. The lead counsel to the inquiry said the majority of organisations involved in the redevelopment were indulging in a merry-go-round of buck-passing. Presenter / producer : Kate Lamble Producer: Luke Radcliff Researcher: May Cameron Contact us via email: [email protected]

Phase 2 of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry starts on Monday 27th January 2020. It will investigate how the tower was covered in combustible materials during a refurbishment, breaching building regulations. Contact us via email: [email protected]

The last podcast analysing the Phase 1 report. In this episode we look in detail at the ‘systemic failings’ Sir Martin Moore-Bick found in the fire brigade’s response. Including in their training, equipment, and their failure to consider a full or partial evacuation of the tower. Producer Kate Lamble Researcher Tom Wright Contact us via email: [email protected]

The report says there was a fundamental failure of command and control when it came to the firefighters at Grenfell. In this episode we look at how the story of flat 142 illustrates this. Producer Kate Lamble Researcher Tom Wright Contact us via email: [email protected]

The report into Phase 1 of the Inquiry found that the tower did not comply with building regulations. In this episode we take a closer look at what happened to the building during the fire and the conclusions and recommendations made by the chair, Sir Martin Moore-Bick. Producer Kate Lamble Researcher Tom Wright Contact us via email: [email protected]

The report into Phase 1 of the inquiry was released today. It found that the tower breached building regulations. It was critical of the London Fire Brigade’s response, arguing that more people would have survived if they had evacuated the tower by 1.50 in the morning. In this episode we look at the main conclusions and recommendations made by the inquiry. Producer Kate Lamble Researcher Tom Wright Contact us via email: [email protected]

The report into Phase 1 of the inquiry is due to be released on the 30th October. In this episode we discuss what that report may include, as well as what the inquiry has been doing since the last piece of evidence was heard ten months ago. Producer Kate Lamble Contact us via email: [email protected]

On the 14th floor of Grenfell Tower, firefighters moved eight residents into flat 113. Only four would survive. Using evidence from phase 1 of the Grenfell Tower Public Inquiry, Katie Razzall pieces together what went wrong that night in flat 113. The answer reveals a catalogue of errors which may help to explain the wider disaster. Producer: Kate Lamble Contact us via email: [email protected]

The final day of hearings for Phase 1. The Tenant Management Organisation, which ran Grenfell Tower, acknowledged that the external cladding created an unprecedented fire. Companies which supplied products used during the refurbishment also submitted written statements. Producer Kate Lamble Researcher Olivia Beazley Contact us via email: [email protected]

Lawyers for survivors called for the stay-put advice to be changed to get out. Counsel for the tenant in flat 16 where the fire started said the inquiry should conclude the fire was accidental. He urged the inquiry not to use firefighters as sacrificial lambs. Producer Kate Lamble Researcher Olivia Beazley Contact us via email: [email protected]

The London Fire Brigade acknowledges it was overwhelmed on the night of the fire. Lawyers for the bereaved, survivors and residents criticise the fire brigade’s response and argue the tower didn’t meet building regulations. Producer Kate Lamble Researcher Olivia Beazley Contact us via email: [email protected]

Today the inquiry heard evidence from the written statements given by the bereaved, survivors and residents of Grenfell. These included accounts from Emmanuella Desaro whose daughter Gloria Trevisan died on the top floor of Grenfell Tower, and Adriana Ramirez, the mother of 12-year-old Jessica Urbano Ramirez, who went up the tower to try to escape the fire. Witness statements from residents who were evacuated from their homes in the wider Lancaster West Estate were also read out. Producers Elisabeth Mahy and Kate Lamble Researcher Olivia Beazley Contact us via email: [email protected]

Expert witness Professor David Purser believes people are more likely to have died from smoke inhalation than from exposure to heat and flames. During a presentation to the inquiry Professor Purser explained how irritants and gases in the smoke would have affected residents and impeded their escape. Producers Elisabeth Mahy and Kate Lamble Researcher Olivia Beazley Contact us via email: [email protected]

Forensic Scientist, Niamh Nic Daeid, agreed that the fire started in the fridge freezer in Flat 16. She told the inquiry she’s certain it was an accident. The Inquiry also released statements from the London Fire Brigade, the local council and the government about what changes they have made since the fire at Grenfell Tower. Producers Elisabeth Mahy and Kate Lamble Researcher Olivia Beazley Contact us via email: [email protected]

Electrical expert Dr Duncan Glover told the inquiry it’s likely the fire started when the wiring in a fridge freezer in Flat 16 overheated. He explained how a small piece of wire, discovered in a bedroom 27 days after the fire, led him to this conclusion. Producers Elisabeth Mahy and Kate Lamble Researcher Olivia Beazley Contact us via email: [email protected]

Nicholas Burton lived in flat 165 on the 19th floor of Grenfell Tower with his wife, Pily, and their dog. In an extended interview with Eddie Mair, Nicholas talks about life at Grenfell before the fire and how he had to give up work to care for his wife who developed dementia. He describes the night of the fire and the impact it has had on him. Contact us via email: [email protected]

Dr. Barbara Lane returned to give a second day of evidence. This time she focusses on fire prevention and safety measures in place inside Grenfell Tower on the night of the fire. The inquiry heard how flat doors did not meet safety regulations, and how firefighters were unable to take control of the lifts. Listen to the full story here: https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p066rd9t Producer Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Olivia Beazley Contact us via email: [email protected]

The inquiry heard from Call Room Operators Yvonne Adams, Christine Howson and Heidi Fox. Yvonne Adams took a call from a woman trapped on the 14th floor who pleaded with her to send for help. Christine Howson said it was so noisy in the control room that she found it difficult to hear callers. Listen to the full story here: https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p066rd9t Producer Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Olivia Beazley Contact us via email: [email protected]

The inquiry heard from expert witness Dr Barbara Lane, a specialist in fire engineering. Her 2,000 page-long report focuses on the fire prevention and safety measures in place on the night of the fire, and to what extent these measures failed to control its spread. Dr Lane told the inquiry that parts of the external cladding did not meet required safety standards. Producer Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Olivia Beazley Contact us via email: [email protected]

Expert witness Professor Luke Bisby explained how the fire spread. He told the inquiry that advice for residents to stay in their flats in the event of a fire should have been scrapped as soon as combustible cladding was fitted to the tower. Producer Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Olivia Beazley Contact us via email: [email protected]

The inquiry hears from Expert Witnesses. Fire safety expert Professor José Torero described how compartmentation in the building failed, and how materials in the external cladding may have contributed to the vertical spread of the fire. Producer Kate Lamble Researcher Olivia Beazley Contact us via email: [email protected]

Sarah Russell had been working as a Control Room Officer for only 9 months before the Grenfell Tower fire. The inquiry heard how she spent almost an hour on the phone with 12 year old Jessica Urbano Ramirez who died on the 23rd floor. The London control room was unable to handle all of the 999 calls made on the night of the fire. Control room officers from Surrey, Kent, and Essex Fire and Rescue Services who helped answer overflow calls also gave evidence. Producers Kate Lamble Researcher Olivia Beazley Contact us via email: [email protected]

The inquiry heard evidence from senior officials in the tenant management organisation which ran the tower. Graham Webb was responsible for repairs inside the building. Hash Chamchoun was Head of Supported Housing. Both were present at Grenfell on the night of the fire. The inquiry also heard from Teresa Brown, who was Director of Housing in June 2017. She described how on the night she gathered information about survivors and residents reported missing. Producers Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Olivia Beazley Contact us via email: [email protected]

The inquiry heard from Nickolas Leyton and Michael Rumble, officials from the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea Council. They both were present at the scene on the night of the fire. Robert Black was chief executive of the council’s tenant management organisation at the time of the fire. He told the inquiry that he remembered very little from events on the night, saying he was “a spare part”. Producers Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Olivia Beazley Contact us via email: [email protected]

The inquiry hears how the gas supply to Grenfell wasn’t disconnected until 23.40. Jason Allday from Cadent told the inquiry that gas contributed to the fire at Grenfell. He spent 24 hours at the scene cutting the supply. The enquiry also heard 23 written statements submitted by witnesses whose relatives died in the fire. Producers Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Olivia Beazley Contact us via email: [email protected]

The inquiry heard how the Metropolitan Police and London Ambulance Service struggled to give advice to residents trapped in the tower who had called 999. Neil Jerome, told the inquiry he didn’t know why the change in stay put advice wasn’t communicated to the police. Paul Woodrow, the director of operations for the London Ambulance Service explained why paramedics did not enter the tower. Producers Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Olivia Beazley Contact us via email: [email protected]

Today the inquiry heard from the two most senior police officers to attend the fire. Inspector Nicholas Thatcher declared the fire a Major Incident shortly before arriving at the scene. Today he told the inquiry how he was afraid the tower would collapse onto members of the public watching from the ground. Commander Neil Jerome, chief officer on-call in London on the night of the fire, also gave evidence. Producers Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Olivia Beazley Contact us via email: [email protected]

The inquiry heard five weeks of evidence from the bereaved, survivors and residents of Grenfell Tower. Thirty-five witnesses gave evidence in person. One hundred and forty written statements have been read-in and published. In this edition of the podcast Eddie Mair pieces together some of the issues that have come up. Producer Olivia Beazley Contact us via email: [email protected]

Warning you may find some parts of this podcast distressing Marcio Gomes told the inquiry how he and his family got out of Grenfell tower from the 21st floor. This includes audio from a 999 call he made on his way down the tower with his daughters and pregnant wife. A 999 call operator remained on the line with Mr Gomes for 33 minutes. The family were separated in the smoke-filled stairwell. Producers Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Olivia Beazley Contact us via email: [email protected]

Warning you may find some parts of this podcast distressing. Marcio Gomes told the inquiry how he and his family got out of Grenfell tower from the 21st floor. The inquiry heard a 999 call he made on his way down the tower. The inquiry also heard evidence from the last person to leave the tower. Elpido Bonifacio, who is registered as blind. He wasn’t rescued until after 8am. Producers Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Olivia Beazley Contact us via email: [email protected]

The Inquiry heard evidence from Natasha Elcock who lived on the 11th floor. Firefighters didn't reach her and her family until 4.30 in the morning. She made 14 calls to the emergency services while she was trapped in her flat. Hanan Wahabi lived in Flat 66 on the 9th floor. After she and her family escaped the tower, she called her brother Abdulaziz El-Wahabi who lived higher up the tower. Producers Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Olivia Beazley Contact us via email: [email protected]

Elizabeth Sobiesczak had lived in Grenfell Tower for 32 years before the fire. Today she described how she got out from the seventh floor with her husband and daughter. The inquiry also heard written evidence from 21 bereaved, survivors and residents. These included accounts from the 15th, 10th, 8th and 6th floors. . Producers Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Olivia Beazley Contact us via email: [email protected]

Nicholas Burton and his wife were rescued by firefighters from their flat on the 19th floor. The inquiry heard how he was led down the stairs through thick black smoke. Helen Gebremeskel who lived on the 21st floor also gave evidence. Her twelve year old daughter was carried from the tower by firefighters after she collapsed in the stairwell. Producers Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Olivia Beazley Contact us via email: [email protected]

The inquiry heard from three witnesses today. They all escaped the tower within forty-five minutes of the first 999 call being made. Rashida Ali left her flat on the 15th floor with her daughter. Her husband Sid Ali Atmani was unwell and chose to stay in bed when his family left. He told the Inquiry how he made the decision to leave the flat when he realised the severity of the fire. Hoang Khanh Quang lived on the 10th floor. She was woken up by the sound of the fire alarm to find flames at her kitchen window. Producers Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Olivia Beazley Contact us via email: [email protected]

Sener Macit stayed in his flat on the 16th floor until after 3.30. It was then the fire broke through his windows, setting his curtains, bed and wardrobe alight. Alemishet Demissie who lived on the 12th floor also gave evidence. She and a friend who was staying in her flat described how the floor turned black while they were trapped. Producers Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Olivia Beazley Contact us via email: [email protected]

Roy Smith thought he and his family were going to die on the 12th floor of Grenfell Tower. Today the inquiry heard how they got out. Written evidence was also read out today. The inquiry heard excerpts from statements made by friends and relatives of the Choucair family, and relatives of Berikti Haftom. Statements from survivors from the 18th and 9th floor were also read out. Producers Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Olivia Beazley Contact us via email: [email protected]

The inquiry heard evidence from Paulos Tekle. His five-year old son, Isaac, got separated from his parents while they were trying to escape from the 18th floor. He died. Rabia Yahya escaped from the 18th floor with her three children. Producers Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Olivia Beazley Contact us via email: [email protected]

Naomi Li is one of two residents from the 22nd floor who survived the fire. She described how she sheltered in a neighbour’s flat before deciding to try and escape down the stairs. Hamid Wahbi lived on the 16th floor of Grenfell tower. He was the only one of his family at home on the night of the fire. Written evidence was read out from other bereaved, survivors and residents. Producers Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Olivia Beazley Contact us via email: [email protected]

Farhad Neda carried his mother Flora down the stairs from the 23rd floor. His father Saber Neda stayed in the flat, assisting other residents who had fled up the tower. The inquiry also heard written evidence from Ahmed Elgwahry who was on the phone to his sister and mother when they were trapped on the top floor. Producers Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Olivia Beazley Contact us via email: [email protected]

The inquiry hears how a resident escaped from the 20th floor Ignoring advice to stay put, Petra Doulova and her husband made their way down the smoke filled stairwell. Jose Vieiro witnessed his kitchen window cave in and his curtains catching fire before he and his wife escaped from their flat on the 7th floor. Producers Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Olivia Beazley Contact us via email: [email protected]

The inquiry hears from two of the eight residents of Grenfell Tower who sheltered in flat 113 on the 14th floor. Among them was Omar Alhaj Ali who managed to escape the fire. He got separated from his brother Mohammad who did not survive. In desperation Oluwasuen Talabi made a make-shift rope from bed sheets and attempted to get his family out of the flat. He eventually escaped down the stairs with his daughter strapped to his back. Producers Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Olivia Beazley Contact us via email: [email protected]

Rosemary Oyewole’s neighbours sheltered in her flat on the 14th floor as the fire spread. She tells the inquiry how her partner made a make-shift rope from bedsheets. They eventually escaped down the staircase with their four year old daughter. The inquiry also heard written statements from seventeen others among the bereaved, survivors and residents. Richard Millett QC read the accounts of some of those who had escaped from other floors, been absent from their flats at the time of the fire, or who lived near Grenfell Tower and witnessed the events unfold. Producers Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Olivia Beazley Contact us via email: [email protected]

Richard Fletcher described how he carried his six-year-old daughter from the 16th floor of the tower. Mariko Toyoshima-Lewis, who uses a wheelchair, waited 45 minutes to be rescued from the 3rd floor of Grenfell Tower. Today she described her experience. Also, housing expert, Richard Blanco, explains who is responsible for the upkeep, refurbishment and safety of residential tower blocks where there are multiple landlords and tenancies. Producers Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Olivia Beazley Contact us via email: [email protected]

Sam Daniels’ father, Joseph, had dementia and was confused as the fire spread to their 16th floor flat. Today the Grenfell Tower Inquiry heard how Sam had to leave his father in the flat to look for help. Also, Branislav Lukic described how he escaped his flat on the 11th floor and rescued another Grenfell resident on his way down. Producers Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Olivia Beazley Contact us via email: [email protected]

Meron Mekonnen ignored stay put advice and escaped Grenfell tower with her partner and two young daughters. She had been told to get out by her aunt, Hiwot Dagnachew, who fled from the 5th floor. They describe making phone calls to a friend still trapped in the tower. Maher Khoudair also gave evidence. He told the inquiry how he walked down the stairs from his ninth floor flat on crutches. Producers Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Olivia Beazley Contact us via email: [email protected]

Munira Mahmud left from her flat with their two young children, her husband and his elderly father. She described the last phone call she had with a close friend stuck on the 23rd floor. Nadia Jafari told of how she was separated from her 82-year-old father as they tried to escape the fire in a smoke-filled lift. Producers Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Olivia Beazley Contact us via email: [email protected]

One of the first people to escape Grenfell tower, Miguel Alves, ignored fire safety advice to stay put, saying it was like “waiting in a trap”. Plus, an 18th floor resident tells the inquiry the building was like a ‘ticking time bomb’. Producers Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Oliver Jones Contact us via email: [email protected]

Antonio Roncolato and Fatima Alves – the first two survivors to give evidence to the inquiry – recount their experience on the night. Antonio was trapped in the tower until just after 6am and Fatima let the first firefighters into the building. Producers Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Oliver Jones Contact us via email: [email protected]

Since June we’ve heard evidence from 82 firefighters. Many carried out rescues, others dealt with 999 calls and some took charge of the incident. In this edition of the podcast Eddie Mair pieces together some of the issues that have arisen. Producer Oliver Jones Contact us via email: [email protected]

The final day of firefighter evidence in this part of the inquiry. Producers Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researchers Oliver Jones Contact us via email: [email protected]

Commissioner Dany Cotton told the inquiry that nothing could have stopped the fire spreading. She acknowledged the London Fire Brigade was aware of the danger of fire spreading on the outside of a building before Grenfell. Producers Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researchers Olivia Beazley and Oliver Jones Contact us via email: [email protected]

In a recording of a discussion held during the incident, Assistant Commissioner Andrew Roe tells the local council its delay in getting building plans to firefighters was a “major deficiency”. Producers Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Oliver Jones Contact us via email: [email protected]

Deputy Assistant Commissioner Andrew O’Loughlin, tells the inquiry Grenfell Tower reacted so badly to fire that no one should have lived there. The inquiry also heard from the second highest ranking officer to attend the incident, Assistant Commissioner, Andrew Roe. Producers Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Oliver Jones Contact us via email: [email protected]

As the Grenfell incident developed, five officers in their turn were placed in command of the fire service response. Today, the inquiry hears from Deputy Assistant Commissioner Andrew O’Loughlin, the third to take charge. Producers Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Oliver Jones Contact us via email: [email protected]

The Inquiry hears from the second firefighter in charge of the incident, Station Manager Andrew Walton. Producers Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Oliver Jones Contact us via email: [email protected]

Watch Manager Norman Harrison tells families who lost loved ones in the fire that he hopes they get the justice they deserve. Plus, Firefighter Adam Johnson helps rescue two people from the 19th floor while running dangerously low on air. Producers Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Oliver Jones Contact us via email: [email protected]

The Inquiry hears two senior firefighters – Group Manager Richard Welch and Deputy Assistant Commissioner Andrew O’Loughlin – were in charge of the incident at the same time, unaware of each other’s actions. Plus, Group Manager Welch explains his decision to stop sending firefighters above the fifteenth floor of Grenfell Tower. Producers Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Oliver Jones Contact us via email: [email protected]

Control Room Operator, Aisha Jabin, describes how she tried to comfort a resident trapped on the top floor over the course of a 40 minute phone call. Deborah Lamprell died in Flat 201 on the 23rd floor with six other people. Producers Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Oliver Jones Contact us via email: [email protected]

Control Room Operator, Peter Duddy, describes how he could not persuade two families on 22nd floor to leave their flat and escape the tower. Operations Manager, Alexandra Norman, tells the inquiry she felt ‘very, very uncomfortable’ with the stay put advice. Producers Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Oliver Jones Contact us via email: [email protected]

The chairman of the inquiry, Sir Martin Moore-Bick, resists calls to make safety recommendations, including an immediate moratorium on flammable cladding, before the end of the year. Plus, senior firefighter Patrick Goulbourne tells the inquiry he never gave up hope residents on the top floors of the tower would be rescued. Producers Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Oliver Jones Contact us via email: [email protected]

Station Manager Peter Wolfenden tells the inquiry a miscommunication between senior officers meant information from 999 calls about residents in the tower wasn’t acted on for an hour. Plus, Watch Manager Matthew Leaver tells the inquiry soon after he arrived he realised firefighters didn’t have the tools to put out the fire that night. Producers Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Oliver Jones Contact us via email: [email protected]

Firefighters Katie Foster and Greg Lawson tell nine residents, including a family whose son died in the tower, to remain inside their flats as the fire spreads. Producers Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Oliver Jones Contact us via email: [email protected]

Firefighters sent to rescue people trapped on the 14th floor give their account of what happened. Zainab Deen, her son Jeremiah, and Dennis Murphy died on the 14th floor. One of their neighbours, Mohammad al-Haj Ali, was found outside the tower. Producers Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Oliver Jones Contact us via email: [email protected]

Watch Manager Peter Johnson tells the inquiry a lack of ‘vital’ building plans held back search and rescue efforts. He repeatedly requested the layouts from the council, but never received them. The inquiry also hears how firefighters had to deal with computer and technology problems on the night. Producers Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Oliver Jones Contact us via email: [email protected]

Six firefighters give evidence to the inquiry. They describe they struggled with low water pressure, falling debris and a lack of training. Producers Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher Oliver Jones Contact us via email: [email protected]

Firefighters are overwhelmed by the volume of 999 calls. Lawyers for survivors, bereaved residents and firefighters urge the inquiry to start making recommendations based on the evidence heard so far. Producers: Kate Lamble and Elisabeth Mahy Researcher: Oliver Jones Contact us via email: [email protected]

Ambrose Mendy lost his cousin Mary Mendy and her daughter Khadija Saye in the fire. Recently he returned to their flat hoping to find something he could take away to remember them by. He has been at the inquiry almost every day. Sangita Myska talks to him about his experience. Producer Oliver Jones Contact us via email: [email protected]

If you’ve just started listening to the podcast this is a good place to start. We’ve pieced together what we’ve learnt as a result of evidence from expert witnesses and firefighters over the past nine weeks. Researcher Oliver Jones Producer Kate Lamble Contact us via email: [email protected]

Crew Manager Christopher Batcheldor recalls how he tried to comfort Zainab Deen who was trapped with her two-year old son Jeremiah on the fourteenth floor. Researcher Oliver Jones Producer Kate Lamble Contact us via email: [email protected]

Station manager Michael Mulholland tells the inquiry adhering to policy was challenging. Plus, we hear from Sharon Darby, the first 999 Control Room Operator to give evidence. Researcher Oliver Jones Producer Kate Lamble Contact us via email: [email protected]

Watch Manager Marc Aston-O’Donovan and firefighter Oliver Desforges help carry out nine rescues on three different floors. Researcher Oliver Jones Producer Kate Lamble Contact us via email: [email protected]

Watch Manager Glynn Williams says he struggled to keep track of who had been rescued. Most of his information came from children. The Inquiry heard in one case a boy told the firefighter the rest of his family were “all dead”. Producer Kate Lamble, Researcher Oliver Jones. Contact us via email: [email protected]

In a special edition of the podcast Eddie Mair speaks to Crew Manager Aldo Diana who rescued nine people. Contact us via email: [email protected]

Watch Manager Louisa de Silvo writes details of those trapped in the tower on the wall of the third floor. She sends a crew to rescue people trapped on the 23rd floor. Plus, Watch Manager Anthony Peckham describes how he watched the entire scene unfold from his command unit. He hears distraught family and friends urging firefighters to help. Contact us via email: [email protected]

Two firefighters who played a vital part in passing on information about trapped residents give evidence. Watch Manager Paul Sadler organised information on a car bonnet before it was taken inside Grenfell Tower to Watch Manager Louisa de Silvo. Contact us via email: [email protected]

A man carrying an axe and claiming to be an American firefighter is told to leave. Plus, how firefighters improvised a system to pass on information about trapped residents by yelling up two flights of stairs. Contact us via email: [email protected]

Firefighters Martin Gillam and Dean Roberts describe how they were sent to the roof to drench the fire from above. They didn’t get that far. Instead they rescued a woman, carrying her down at least 17 flights of stairs. Firefighter Stephen O’Donoghue was sent to rescue two people in flat 95 on the 12th floor but ran into a family on the 11th floor. He carried one of them out of the building. Contact us via email: [email protected]

Firefighter Richard Hippel and Crew Manager Jamal Stern recall their attempt to rescue a bedridden man on the 16th floor. Plus, firefighter Harry Bettinson explains how he stayed with a family trapped on the ninth floor before bringing them to safety. Contact us via email: [email protected]

Control room officer, Sarah Russell, recalls how she stayed on the phone with 12-year-old Jessica Urbano Ramirez, who was trapped on the 23rd floor, until the line fell silent. Plus, firefighter Raymond Keane tells the inquiry that spraying water onto the side of the building made almost no difference. Contact us via email: [email protected]

The highest ranked officer in the 999 control room – Deputy Assistant Commissioner Adrian Fenton – recalls how TV images of the fire influenced the decision to change the stay-put advice to residents. Plus, a solicitor who represented the family of three people who died in the Lakanal House tower block fire in 2009, tells us the Government could have done more to prevent Grenfell. Contact us via email: [email protected]

Station Manager Jason Oliff told the inquiry he spent four hours dealing with information from phone calls of residents trapped in the tower. He faced the “impossible” decision to tell a father to go back up the smoke filled staircase to find his family, despite fears he would die. Contact us via email: [email protected]

Senior Operations Manager, Joanne Smith, changes the stay put advice to residents trapped in the tower. She explains to the inquiry why she did this. We hear evidence of 999 calls made by residents trapped on the upper floors of Grenfell. Contact us via email: [email protected]

Senior Operations Manager Joanne Smith gives the inquiry its first insight into the 999 control room. 344 calls were made to 999 on the night of the fire, many from residents unable to leave their flats because of fire heat or smoke. Joanne Smith tells the inquiry what guidance was given to residents who called the emergency services. Contact us via email: [email protected]

Watch Manager Daniel Meyrick explains his role as a command support officer. He coordinated information from the 999 control room to firefighters in the tower. Contact us via email: [email protected]

Watch Manager Brien O’Keeffe describes the moment 999 calls stopped coming from inside Grenfell Tower. Firefighter Christopher Dorgu talks about how he helped carry casualties outside, and he names the piece of equipment which he thinks could have saved lives on the night of the disaster. Contact us via email: [email protected]

Watch Manager Brien O’Keeffe gives evidence to the inquiry. He describes how firefighters ran out of equipment. Some used their breathing apparatus to help rescue residents trapped in the smoke-filled stairwell in the tower. Contact us via email: [email protected]

Crew Manager Christopher Secrett and Watch Manager Brien O’Keeffe give evidence to the inquiry. Christopher Secrett runs low on air while attempting a rescue on the twentieth floor. He thinks he won’t make it out alive. Contact us via email: [email protected]

Fire Safety Officer Daniel Egan, Crew Manager Christopher Secrett and Firefighter John O’Hanlon give evidence to the inquiry. Daniel Egan speaks to a mother trapped in the tower with her two children. Contact us via email: [email protected]

Firefighter Justin O’Beirne and Senior Fire Safety Officer Daniel Egan give evidence to the inquiry. Justin O’Beirne tells the inquiry about an attempted rescue of a bedbound man on the 16th floor. Daniel Egan explained how he dealt with information from 999 calls made by residents in the tower. Contact us via email: [email protected]

Firefighters Justin O’Beirne and Thomas Abell give evidence to the inquiry. Both had problems communicating on the night with other firefighters and the officers in command. A resident tried to escape by tying bedsheets together. Thomas Abell dissuaded him. Contact us via email: [email protected]

Firefighters Daniel Brown and David Badillo give evidence to the inquiry. They highlight communication problems during the night of the fire. We also hear one of the first accounts of a rescue attempt, when David Badillo climbed twelve flights of stairs to try and help a girl down from the twentieth floor. Contact us via email: [email protected]

The first firefighters who tackled the fire in flat 16 give evidence. Charles Batterbee tells the inquiry how he held on to Daniel Brown for dear life as he leaned out of the window trying to put out the fire as it spreads up the building. Contact us via email: [email protected]

The first firefighter to take charge at Grenfell continues his evidence. Michael Dowden said he did the best job he could as a firefighter on the night. Also, we hear from Fatima Alves who lived at Grenfell and let the first firefighters into the tower. She tells us how she and her family are coping a year on from the fire. Contact us via email: [email protected]

The first firefighter to take charge at Grenfell continues his evidence. Michael Dowden broke down in tears as footage of the burning block was shown to the inquiry. Also, we hear from Fatima Alves who lived at Grenfell and let the first firefighters into the tower. Contact us via email: [email protected]

The first firefighter to take charge at Grenfell gives his evidence. Michael Dowden told the inquiry he had no training on how to evacuate people from a high-rise block. Contact us via email: [email protected]

Flat 16: the inquiry hears evidence from the residents of the flat where the fire started. It’s also the start of evidence from firefighters. Contact us via email: [email protected]

The inquiry hears evidence about how the fire spread from where it started in flat 16. Expert witness, Professor Luke Bisby of Edinburgh University, said the fire was unlike any other which has happened abroad because it spread in all directions. Contact us via email: [email protected]

The inquiry sees footage of the moment when firefighters entered flat 16 on the fourth floor where the fire started. Professor Niamh Nic Daeid of Dundee University presents her report into how and where the fire started

The failure of fire safety measures at Grenfell Tower. The inquiry hears from fire safety engineer, Barbara Lane. She sets out how said the building's fire lift and doors did not comply with building regulations and details the combustible materials used around the refurbished window fittings and external cladding which allowed the fire to spread.

The final day of opening statements. The inquiry hears from lawyers for the London Fire Brigade and firefighting unions. Plus, Richard Millett QC responds to calls for changes to the inquiries terms of reference

The third day of opening statements. The inquiry hears from lawyers for the resident in whose flat the fire started, the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea and the Tenant Management Organisation which managed Grenfell Tower

The second day of opening statements hears from lawyers for survivors, bereaved and residents plus The Metropolitan Police. The role of race and religion in the disaster is raised

The inquiry moves to Holborn Bars for the first day of opening statements. Richard Millett QC, sets out the lines of investigation. Five expert reports list a catalogue of failures before the fire at Grenfell Tower

The inquiry hears the final day of commemorations from the family and friends people who died in the Grenfell Tower fire. Today the relatives of Raymond “Moses” Bernard, Omar Belkadi, Farah Hamdan, Malak Belkadi, Leena Belkadi, Sakineh Afrasiabi, Fatemeh Afrasiabi, Isra Ibrahim, Gary Maunders, Sirria Choucair, Nadia Choucair, Bassem Choucair, Mierna Choucair, Fatima Choucair and Zainab Choucair spoke

The inquiry hears commemorations from the family and friends of fifteen people who died in the Grenfell Tower fire. Today the relatives of Eslah Elgwahry, Mariem Elgwahry, Gloria Trevisan, Isaac Paulos, Berkti Haftom, Biruk Haftom, Sakineh Afrasiabi, Hamid Kani, Mohammed al-Haj Ali, Fathia Ali Ahmed Elsanosi, Isra Ibrahim, Abufars Ibrahim, Rania Ibrahim, Fethia Hassan and Hania Hassan spoke

The inquiry hears commemorations from the family and friends of fifteen people who died in the Grenfell Tower fire. Today the relatives of Vincent Chiejina, Ligaya Moore, Abdulaziz El Wahabi, Faouzia El Wahabi, Yasin El Wahabi, Nur Huda El Wahabi, Mehdi El Wahabi, Hashim Kedir, Nura Jemal, Yahya Hashim, Firdaws Hashim, Yaqub Hashim, Khadija Khaloufi, Steve Power and Jessica Urbano Ramirez spoke. We also talk to one of the people who gave one of the memorials this week – Michael Volpe.

The inquiry hears commemorations from the family and friends of twelve people who died in the Grenfell Tower fire. Today the relatives of Victoria King, Alexandra Atala, Mohamednur Tuccu, Amal Ahmedin, Amaya Tuccu-Ahmedin, Amna Mahmud Idris, Kamru Miah, Rabeya Begum, Mohammed Hamid, Mohammed Hanif, Husna Begum, Fathia Ali Ahmed Elsanosi spoke

The inquiry hears commemorations from the family and friends of ten people who died in the Grenfell Tower fire. Today the relatives of Anthony Disson, Zainab Deen, Jeremiah Deen, Ali Yawar Jafari, Gary Maunders, Majorie Vital, Ernie Vital, Rania Ibrahim, Fethia Hassan and Hania Hassan spoke

The inquiry hears commemorations from the family and friends of fourteen people who died in the Grenfell Tower fire. Today the relatives of Deborah Lamprell, Maria del Pilar Burton, Rania Ibrahim, Fethia Hassan, Hania Hassan, Sirria Choucair, Nadia Choucair, Bassem Choucair, Mierna Choucair, Fatima Choucair, Zainab Choucair, Hesham Rahman, Mary Mendy and Khadija Saye spoke

On the first day of the public inquiry family and friends of those who died in the Grenfell Tower fire commemorated their loved ones. Today the relatives of Logan Gomes, Denis Murphy, Mohamed Amied Neda, Joseph Daniels, Mary Mendy and Khadija Saye spoke

Public inquiries are limited in what they can achieve. They don't have judicial powers so they can’t decide guilt or innocence. Inquiries – such as the one into the Grenfell Tower fire – produce a report and make a set of recommendations which the government of the day can choose to implement or ignore. So, what do fire safety experts, the survivors and the bereaved of Grenfell hope this public inquiry can achieve?

The retired judge Sir Martin Moore-Bick is chairing the Grenfell inquiry and will be responsible for producing the final recommendations, but what do we know about him? And why has there been such a debate about whether a panel will sit alongside him?

How has the relationship between the community and officials changed in the wake of the Grenfell Tower fire? BBC Newsnight's Katie Razzall walks us through the events between the June 2017 and the start of the public inquiry.

A guide to the rooms where the inquiry is taking place in central London. Plus some advice from Dame Janet Smith who chaired a public inquiry into Harold Shipman and Julie Bailey who campaigned for an inquiry into failings at Staffordshire hospital.

A daily podcast from the public inquiry into the fire at Grenfell Tower in June 2017.