For many years, China’s nuclear doctrine was widely described as “minimum nuclear deterrence,” which essentially means that it relied on a limited number of nuclear weapons to deter an adversary from attacking. China’s authoritative defense white papers asserted that China sought to maintain a lean, effective and credible deterrent force, was committed to the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, pursued a defensive nuclear strategy and would never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country. In recent years, however, China has begun to expand and modernize its nuclear forces. Beijing is not transparent about its nuclear arsenal or its doctrine, however, which creates uncertainty for the United States and its allies.To help us decipher Beijing’s rapid nuclear expansion, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by John Culver, a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and a former CIA senior intelligence officer. He is a co-author of a recent report published by the Atlantic Council titled “Adapting US Strategy to Account for China’s Transformation into a Peer Nuclear Power.” Episode Highlights[1:55] Key identifiable changes in China’s nuclear forces [3:49] China’s nascent nuclear triad [6:51] The drivers of China’s nuclear expansion [11:00] The recent ICBM test and its implications [14:50] How China might use its nuclear weapons [18:43] Will China change its nuclear declaratory policy[24:59] How China’s relationship with Russia could shape Beijing’s calculous [27:45] How the U.S. and its allies should respond  

There are many writings by Western scholars on Chinese foreign as well as domestic policy. Yet few have ventured to analyze the internal intellectual debates in China that, either partly or significantly, shape Chinese policymaking. A recent book from the European Council on Foreign Relations titled The Idea of China: Chinese Thinkers on Power, Progress, and People, intends to fill that gap. Written by Alicja Bachulska, Mark Leonard, and Janka Oertel, the book presents some of the leading Chinese perspectives on a range of contemporary global as well as domestic issues. To help us further understand Chinese thinking and its significance, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Alicja Bachulska, one of the co-authors of the book and a policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. Timestamps[01:22] Significance of Intellectual Debates in China[04:31] Gauging the Candor of Interview Responses[06:35] Who are the China solutionists? [08:25] Examining the “Great Changes” Taking Place[11:52] Strengthening China’s Discourse Power[15:22] Where is China successfully shaping narratives?[18:05] China on the Defense or Offense[22:36] Rising East, Declining West[28:49] Responding to Chinese Discourse in the Global South 

The Forum on China–Africa Cooperation, or FOCAC, was established in 2000 as a platform for facilitating multilateral cooperation between the People’s Republic of China and countries in Africa. A FOCAC summit is held every three years and is the occasion to issue joint declarations and a three-year China-Africa program plan. The 2024 FOCAC took place in Beijing from September 4th to September 6th under the theme “Joining Hands to Advance Modernization and Build a High-Level China-Africa Community with a Shared Future.” Heads of state and delegations from 53 African countries attended the forum, which made it the largest diplomatic event held by China this year.To discuss the recent FOCAC meeting and Chinese interests in Africa, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Mr. Paul Nantulya who is Research Associate at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies at National Defense University. His research interests center on African security issues, and China-Afro-Asia engagements.   Timestamps[00:00] Start[01:38] History of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation [03:56] FOCAC and Chinese Interests in Africa [06:46] Africa in China’s Hierarchy of Relationships[10:28] Sino-American Competition in the Global South [13:20] Takeaways from the Recent FOCAC Summit[18:27] Chinese Military Assistance in Africa[24:27] FOCAC Engagement with Non-Governmental Entities [27:52] African Perceptions of the Efficacy of FOCAC

New Caledonia is a French territory comprising dozens of islands in the South Pacific. It possesses 25% of world’s nickel resources, a mineral critical in the development of weaponry. Several referenda on full independence from France have been held, but none have passed. In recent years, China has paid growing attention to the region, and New Caledonia is one of its targets of interest.A new report from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), titled “When China knocks at the door of New Caledonia,” explains China’s interests, intentions, and activities in New Caledonia. It calls for greater attention to the territory and makes recommendations for the US and other regional actors to address the growing Chinese interference.To discuss Beijing’s approach to New Caledonia, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by the report’s author, Anne-Marie Brady, Professor of Political Science at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand. She specializes in Chinese domestic politics and foreign policy, polar politics, China-Pacific politics, and New Zealand foreign policy.  Timestamps[00:00] Start[01:46] Introduction to New Caledonia[04:20] China’s Interest and Involvement [07:22] Expansion of the International United Front [11:48] Manifestation Within New Caledonia[16:22] The Belt and Road Initiative in New Caledonia[21:34] Establishing Diplomatic Relations[25:29] China’s Relationship with France[28:29] Recommendations for Outside Powers and Others

Most observers of China’s relations with the world maintain that China’s foreign policy started becoming more assertive beginning in the 2010s. The label “wolf warrior diplomacy” was coined by Western media to describe the aggressive language used by Chinese diplomats. The term “wolf warrior” comes from the title of the Chinese action film Wolf Warrior 2 and describes a more combative approach used by many Chinese diplomats, especially in social media and in interviews.Explanations for China’s increased diplomatic assertiveness vary, ranging from rising military and economic might to the personal leadership style of General Secretary Xi Jinping. A recently published book titled “China’s Rising Foreign Ministry,” investigates the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in shaping and implementing Chinese foreign policy. In the words of a Southeast Asian diplomat who was interviewed by the book’s author, “China has a bigger international influence in the last five years—and it is the PRC foreign ministry that is pushing and driving it" (114).Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by the book’s author Dylan Loh Ming Hui, Assistant Professor of Public Policy and Global Affairs at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. His research focuses on Chinese foreign policy, Southeast Asian regionalism, and Asian conceptions of the international order.  Timestamps[01:57] What questions was the book seeking to address? [04:29] What do observers get wrong about China’s foreign ministry? [08:22] China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Policy Formulation[13:30] Characteristics of Chinese Diplomacy in Southeast Asia[16:50] Relationship Between the Chinese MFA and PLA [20:10] The Role of the International Liaison Department[22:22] Interview Example from Dylan’s Publication[25:04] Policy Implications and Lessons to be Learned[28:43] Changes Since the Publication of the Book[32:15] Predictions for the Future of the China MFA

The waters, as well as the rocks, reefs and submerged shoals of the South China Sea are a major source of friction in East Asia. In recent months, tensions have flared between two of the claimants – China and the Philippines – over Second Thomas Shoal, a submerged feature in the Spratly Islands, which the Chinese call Ren Ai Jiao. In 1999, the Philippines intentionally grounded a Philippine Navy transport vessel called the Sierra Madre on the reef and since then the outpost has been manned by a small contingent of marines.In 2016, an arbitral tribunal established under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea ruled that Second Thomas Shoal is a low-tide elevation located within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines and therefore sovereignty belongs to the Philippines. No other country can legitimately claim sovereignty over the feature or the waters around it. Beijing doesn’t recognize the ruling, even though it was legally binding on both China and the Philippines.Late last year, Chinese Coast Guard and maritime militia vessels began aggressively interfering with the Philippines’ routine missions to deliver supplies to the Filipino forces on the Sierra Madre. On several occasions, Chinese ships have used high-pressure water cannons and rammed Filipino boats. The most serious confrontation took place in mid-June, when the Chinese used axes and knives to damage multiple Philippine vessels. A Filipino navy sailor lost his thumb in the skirmish. Negotiations between Beijing and Manila in early July produced a provisional arrangement, and the Philippines subsequently successfully conducted a resupply operation. It is uncertain whether the understanding will hold, however, since Beijing and Manila publicly disagree about what has been agreed upon.To discuss the situation at Second Thomas Shoal and China’s approach to the South China Sea, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Zhang Feng, a visiting scholar at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center. His research focuses on Chinese foreign policy, international relations theory, and international relations in East Asia.  Timestamps[00:00] Start[02:31] Why is the South China Sea so important to China? [05:30] Has China overstepped in the South China Sea? [08:54] Reasons for Deepening Sino-Filipino Confrontation[12:05] Beijing’s Reaction to a Reinforced Second Thomas Shoal[13:30] Beijing’s Perception of the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty[16:44] Miscalculating American Willingness to Intervene[21:32] Beijing-Manila Provisional Agreement [25:00] Chinese Deadline for the Philippines vis-à-vis the Second Thomas Shoal[27:38] Gauging the Risk of Escalation or Conflict[30:25] Stabilizing and Resolving the Second Thomas Shoal Issue

Founded in 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is a Eurasian political, economic, and security forum led by Russia and China. And on July 4, 2024, the 24th summit of the SCO was convened in Astana, Kazakhstan. The summit resulted in the Astana Declaration that reaffirmed cooperation among the member states. This year’s summit was particularly notable due to Belarus’s accession as the SCO’s first European member state and the tenth member of the SCO. The continuous enlargement of the SCO seems indicative of the organization’s shifting role, evolving from a regional cooperative forum to a broader, perhaps counter-western bloc. This episode will focus on China’s strategy in the SCO, its intentions, and its objectives. Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Eva Seiwert, an analyst at the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS). Her research interests include China-Russia relations, China’s central Asian relations, and China’s behavior in international organizations.  Timestamps[01:39] Shifting Focus of the SCO[03:32] Enlargement of the SCO[05:25] SCO and China’s Foreign Policy[07:22] July 2024 SCO Summit[09:46] Implementation of Agreements[11:38] Sino-Russian Sideline Meeting[13:09] Sino-Russian Competition or Coordination[15:14] Sino-Belarussian Joint Military Drill[16:56] SCO and the War in Ukraine[19:04] Controversial Issues in the SCO[20:26] Tensions Between China and India[21:29] New SCO Member States[23:07] SCO and Chinese Institution Building [25:40] The impact of SCO: Why does it matter?

Quantum computing uses quantum mechanics to perform fast and complex calculations. It is often defined as a disruptive technology and is among the advanced technologies at the forefront of US-China competition. Although the US has been in the lead in the development and applications of quantum technology, China is making rapid strides. Earlier this year, China’s independently developed quantum computer, Origin Wukong, named after the Monkey King (a famous character from Chinese mythology) made the country the third in the world to develop this state-of-the-art machine. Quantum computing has many potential applications, including financial modeling, artificial intelligence, scientific research, as well as in defense areas, such as undersea warfare and military communications networks. A new report from the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), titled “The Quest for Qubits: Assessing U.S.-China Competition in Quantum Computing” explains the quantum strategies being pursued by the US and China. It makes recommendations for the US to strengthen its position in its competition with China in quantum computing.Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by the report’s author, Sam Howell, an adjunct associate fellow, with the Technology and National Security program at CNAS. Her research interests include quantum information science, semi-conductor STEM workforce issues, and the use of emerging technologies to enhance human performance.  Timestamps[02:00] What is quantum computing?[04:10] Quantum Computing in US-China Competition[05:58] American and Chinese Strengths and Weaknesses[09:36] Possibility of Working with Other Actors[11:56] Status of US-China Scientific Collaboration[14:30] Chinese Technological Self-Sufficiency[17:58] Building a Quantum Technology Supply Chain[22:05] Fostering a Quantum Technology Workforce[25:52] Key Variables of US-China Competition

On May 27th, China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea concluded their Ninth Trilateral Summit in Seoul. Leaders of the three countries resumed their highest-level annual meetings for the first time in over four years. At the conclusion of the meeting, they issued a joint declaration that includes six priority areas of cooperation, ranging from sustainable development to economic collaboration and trade. What were Beijing’s interests and motivations in reviving this trilateral mechanism?To discuss China’s participation in the trilateral summit, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Yun Sun, a Senior Fellow and Co-director of the East Asia program and Director of the China program at the Stimson Center in Washington. Timestamps[01:18] Reestablishing the Trilateral Leadership Mechanism[06:14] Outcomes and Deliverables of the Trilateral Summit[10:37] 2019 Chengdu Denuclearization Agreement[13:38] China’s Import Ban on Japanese Seafood[18:07] China on US-Japan-ROK Trilateral Cooperation[23:58] Warming Russian-North Korean Relations[29:30] Would Xi Jinping express his concerns with Vladimir Putin?

On May 17, Russian President Vladimir Putin concluded a two-day visit to China for his 43rd meeting with Xi Jinping. Based on public readouts, Putin emphasized the economic benefits that the Sino-Russian partnership could bring to both countries. Economic integration between Russia and China has accelerated dramatically, with total trade between them reaching $240 billion US dollars in 2023. Beijing’s decision to increase trade with Moscow after the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine has kept the Russian economy afloat. Western sanctions have failed to cripple Russia’s economy or its war effort. After the European Union halted the import of Russian oil, China stepped in and has since become Russia’s top energy buyer. Moreover, China has become Russia’s top goods supplier, having surged its sales of machine tools, microelectronics, and other technology that Moscow uses to produce weaponry in its ongoing war with Ukraine. To discuss China’s trade with Russia, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Yanmei Xie. Yanmei is a Geopolitics Analyst at Gavekal Research, where she analyzes the implications of rising geopolitical and geoeconomic risks on trade, investments, and supply chains. Yanmei recently published a report on China’s economic support for Russia, which was titled “How China Keeps Russia in Business.”  Timestamps[02:00] China’s Economic Support of Russia [05:29] Areas of Success for Western Sanctions[07:11] A Surge in Chinese Exports After the Invasion of Ukraine [09:54] Chinese Playbook for Circumventing Sanctions[13:36] Chinese Provision of Crucial Materials[15:17] Incentive to Capture the Russian Energy Market[19:17] Impact of Western Industrial Policies on Sino-Russian Trade [20:20] Possibility of Increased Sanctions to Deter China[23:24] China’s Toolbox of Retaliatory Measures [26:48] Plateauing Economic Support for Russia

China’s rate of economic growth has slowed markedly in recent years. According to Chinese government statistics, the economy grew by 5.2% in 2023. There are numerous challenges: weak consumer confidence, mounting local government debt, and a real estate market that used to fuel the economy, but is now in a prolonged downturn.Many economists, including some in China, advocate that the government stimulate consumer spending. It is clear, however, that Xi Jinping is pursuing a different strategy. And this was quite clear when Chinese Premier Li Qiang delivered the Government Work Report last March.Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Tanner Greer, who argued in a recent article published in Foreign Policy and in his blog, The Scholar’s Stage, that Xi Jinping and the Politburo believe that science and technology are the answer to China’s problems. To quote from the article: “the central task of the Chinese state is to build an industrial and scientific system capable of pushing humanity to new technological frontiers.” Tanner is the director of the Center for Strategic Translation. As a journalist and researcher, his writing focuses on world politics and history.  Timestamps[01:43] Historical Narrative Informing China’s Belief in Techno-Industrial Policy[03:47] How does China’s own history fit into this narrative?[06:36] Evidence that Xi Jinping Believes in a Technological Revolution[09:37] How does China assess the global balance of power?[12:26] Three Premises Behind China’s Techno-Industrial Drive[14:08] Influence of Intensifying US-China Technology Competition[17:12] Acceleration of New Quality Productive Forces[19:32] Skepticism of China’s Strategy[26:43] Chinese Intellectuals Writing on Techno-Industrial Policy

In the past few weeks, China’s relations with Latin America and the Caribbean have been making headlines. Newsweek published an exclusive story about plans to create a Chinese-run special economic zone on the island of Antigua that will have a port, a dedicated airline, its own customs and immigration procedures, and be able to issue passports. An international crypto services zone will offer opportunities to participate in cryptocurrency operations from mining to dealing.The Americas Quarterly reported that China has expressed interest in building a port complex near the Strait of Magellan at the southern tip of South America, which is considered the most important natural passage between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. From there, according to the Americas Quarterly, Beijing could grow its presence in the region and also project influence in Antarctica.And in late April, China held the first China-Latin American and Caribbean States Space Cooperation Forum, which opened with a congratulatory letter from Xi Jinping applauding the high-level space cooperation partnership in which he emphasized the benefits of marrying China’s mature space technology with the unique geographic advantage of the countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region.To discuss Chinese interests in and strategy toward the Latin America and Caribbean region–known as the LAC–host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Leland Lazarus. He is the Associate Director of National Security at Florida International University’s Jack D. Gordon Institute of Public Policy and an expert on China-Latin America relations. He formerly served as the Special Assistant and Speechwriter to the Commander of US Southern Command and as a State Department Foreign Service Officer, with postings in Barbados and China.  Timestamps[02:30] China’s Interest in LAC Countries[04:44] Implementation of BRI in LAC Countries[07:23] China’s Investment in Energy Development[09:39] Huawei’s Penetration into LAC Countries[11:57] Role of Perú in Beijing’s Regional Strategy[14:56] China-LAC Cooperation in Space[20:56] Receptivity of China to LAC Countries[25:30] How should the US compete against China in LAC? 

The Biden administration maintains that China is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and the power to do so. One part of China’s economic statecraft toolkit involves state-directed investments through high profile projects in the Belt and Road Initiative which are funded by loans through Chinese development banks. But the role and impact of Chinese companies that provide equity funding for FDI often receive less attention. Does Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) have illiberal effects on recipient countries. And is this goal part of China’s economic statecraft and foreign policy strategy.To address these questions and more, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Jan Knoerich. He is the author on a chapter of Chinese FDI on the recent Oxford publication “Rising Power, Limited Influence”, a collection of essays on the effects of Chinese investment in Europe. Dr. Knoerich is a senior lecturer on the Chinese economy for the Lau China Institute at King’s College in London. He is an expert on the Chinese economy, FDI, and international investment law and policy.  Timestamps[01:38] Evolution of Chinese Foreign Investment Strategies[04:48] Chinese Firms Undertaking Foreign Direct Investment[09:16] Impacts of Chinese FDI: Five Dimensions [18:17] Reasons Why Chinese Firms are Viewed with Suspicion[21:06] Impacts of Chinese FDI Projects in Europe[24:59] Evidence of Chinese FDI Exerting Political Influence

When Hong Kong was handed over to China by the United Kingdom 1997, the city was given a mini-Constitution called the “Basic Law.” Article 23 of the Basic Law states that Hong Kong shall enact laws of its own to prohibit various national security offenses. The law did not pass, however, and was scrapped after mass protests in 2003. And in 2020, the Central Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) imposed a separate national security law on Hong Kong, citing the city’s delay in acting on Article 23. This year on March 19th, Article 23 was passed unanimously by the city’s parliament and it came into effect just days later. The law covers five types of crime: treason, insurrection and incitement to mutiny, theft of state secrets, and espionage, sabotage, and external interference. Critics say that Article 23 could lead to even further erosions of civil liberties in Hong Kong.To discuss Article 23 and its implications, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Eric Yan-ho Lai. Dr. Lai is a Research Fellow at the Georgetown Center for Asian Law, an Associate Fellow at the Hong Kong Studies Hub of the University of Surrey, and a member of the Asian Civil Society Research Network.  Timestamps[01:47] Understanding PRC Definitions Used in Article 23[03:37] Why was Article 23 passed now?[05:23] Compressed Timeline for Unanimous Approval[09:05] Shift in Risk Assessment for Multinational Corporations[12:03] Precedents for Targeting Diaspora Communities[14:17] Reactions to Article 23 from the International Community[15:54] What are some concrete actions that could be taken to signal concern?[17:55] Do the PRC and Hong Kong care about international perceptions?[19:36] Implementation of Article 23 Moving Forward[21:28] Passage of Additional Security Legislature[22:57] Forecast for the Future of Hong Kong     

In the past decade, policy toward China has hardened on both sides of the Atlantic. Governments and publics across Europe and in the United States view Xi Jinping as implementing more repressive policies domestically and more aggressive policies abroad. The US and most capitals in Europe see Beijing as seeking to revise the international order in ways that would be disadvantageous to democracies. They agree on the need for de-risking and to preserve the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. Yet, despite the alignment in transatlantic assessments, cooperation on China remains limited. A new paper by experts from Chatham House and RUSI, leading think tanks in the United Kingdom, analyzes why transatlantic mechanisms have made slow progress, focusing on three domains: economics; security; and the multilateral system and global norms. The paper also offers ways to strengthen cooperation going forward. The title of the report is “Transatlantic China Policy: In Search of an Endgame?” Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by one of its authors, Ben Bland who is the director of the Asia-Pacific program at Chatham House. His research focuses on the nexus of politics, economics, and international relations in Southeast Asia, as well as China’s growing role in the broader region and the contours of US–China strategic competition.  Timestamps[01:46] Why did you pursue this research on transatlantic mechanism?[03:24] Importance of Agreeing on an Endgame[06:30] Consensus and Divergence between the US and Europe[10:10] De-risking: One Word, Many Meanings [15:00] Transatlantic Discussions on European and Indo-Pacific Security[18:40] Can a regional division of labor strategy work?[22:13] China, the Multilateral System, and Global Norms[27:00] Tensions Between EU Multilateralism and Transatlantic Consensus[31:10] What are the next steps for Chatham House?

On a previous episode of the China Global Podcast, we discussed Beijing’s position on the conflict in Gaza during the early days following Hamas’ attacks on Israel on October 7, 2023. Today, we discuss one of the conflict’s spillover effects– the attacks on cargo and trade ships transiting the Red Sea by the Houthis, an Iranian-backed Shia group governing parts of Yemen. While the Chinese-brokered rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran was as the beginning of a “wave of reconciliation” in the region by China’s foreign minister Wang Yi, the resurgence of violence since October 7th has proven that prediction to be overly optimistic. At face value, disruptions of global trade may seem to run counter to Chinese interests, but Beijing’s hesitance to become more deeply involved in the crisis may tell us something about China’s calculations in this crisis. It may also show the limits of Chinese influence in the region. Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Ahmed Aboudouh. Ahmed is an associate fellow with the Middle East and North Africa Program at Chatham House, a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council, and heads the China Studies research unit at the Emirates Policy Center. His research focuses on China’s rising influence in the Middle East and North Africa region, Gulf geopolitics, and the effects of China-US competition worldwide. Timestamps[01:36] China’s Statement on Palestine at the International Court of Justice[08:20] Why is China indirectly supporting Hamas despite its relations with Israel?[12:11] Effectiveness of China’s Narrative Critical of America and the West[16:54] Israel, Palestine, and China’s Diplomatic Calculus[20:12] China’s Hesitance to Counter the Houthis in the Red Sea[25:15] Does China have leverage over Iran, and if so, will they use it?[29:59] Circumstances for Deeper Chinese Involvement

On February 1st 2021, the Tatmadaw, or Myanmar military began a coup d’etat against the democratically-elected government, which was led by the National League for Democracy (or NLD) just before elected officials from the November 2020 elections could be sworn in. Since then, Myanmar has been largely controlled by a military junta, who continue to struggle against multiple ethnically-aligned armies dispersed throughout the country. Some countries in the region have refused to recognize the junta, but the People’s Republic of China called the coup simply a “major cabinet reshuffle” and accelerated their military trade with the junta while decrying Western sanctions on the country as escalatory measures, even going so far as to veto a security council resolution condemning the coup alongside Russia. China’s approach to relations with Myanmar since the coup have been evolving swiftly, especially since the recent Operation 1027, a large offensive staged by the ethnic armed forces coalition known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance on October 27th 2023. The losses by the junta during the operation revealed their control of the country to be more tenuous than Beijing might have expected and exemplify the complex factors going into China’s decision-making approach to the conflict. For this episode, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Jason Tower, the country director for the Burma program at the United States Institute for Peace. Tower has over 20 years of experience working in conflict and security issues in China and Southeast Asia, including analysis on cross-border investments, conflict dynamics, and organized crime in the region. He worked previously in Beijing and is a former Fulbright research student and Harvard-Yenching fellow.  Timestamps[02:07] China’s Interest in the Myanmar Conflict[05:48] China’s Engagement with Parties in Myanmar[12:48] Impact of China’s Brokered Ceasefires [20:30] Credibility of China in Southeast Asia[25:15] Myanmar in the US-China Relationship

Many books about US-China strategic competition have been published in recent years. This episode will focus on Facing China: The Prospect for War and Peace, which examines various flashpoints in the Indo-Pacific that could result in military conflict.There are several reasons why this book stands out: First, it includes an examination of debates within China about China’s national interests; Second, it focuses not only on the challenges of major wars, but also on China’s gray-zone strategy of deliberately pursuing its interests in ways that stay below the threshold that would trigger a US military response. And finally, it assesses the applicability of the Thucydides Trap to the US-China relationship. The Thucydides Trap concept was coined by Graham Allison who examined historical cases in which a rising power threatened to displace a ruling power in his book Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? Allison concluded that in the majority of historical cases the outcome was war.This book is especially interesting because it is written by a European expert who has deep knowledge of Taiwan, mainland China, and the United States: Jean-Pierre Cabestan. He is an emeritus senior researcher at the French Center for Scientific Research in Paris and an emeritus professor political science at the Department of Government and International Studies at Hone Kong Baptist University, and a visiting senior fellow at GMF.  Timestamps[02:07] Revisiting the Thucydides Trap [03:53] Why was China fascinated by this concept? [05:26] Reasons for the Risk of War Increasing[06:33] The US-China Cold War and its Characteristics[09:03] China’s Gray-Zone Activities [10:53] Where has China’s gray-zone strategy been the most successful? [12:37] Unifying Taiwan with China through Gray-Zone Activities[14:42] Chinese Use of Force in the Taiwan Strait in the 2020s[16:17] China’s Ambitions in the International Arena[17:40] Future Overseas Operations of the PLA  

On December 27 and 28, 2023, the Communist Party of China held the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs. This was the sixth such meeting – the first one was held way back in 1971. This Foreign Affairs Work Conference was the third held under Xi Jinping’s leadership, with earlier meetings held in 2014 and 2018.Xi delivered a major speech at the Work Conference, which marks the most comprehensive expression yet of his more activist approach to PRC diplomacy. The speech provides valuable insights into Xi’s assessment of the global balance of power, his vision of the international order, and his views of the role of Chinese diplomacy.Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Neil Thomas, a Fellow for Chinese Politics at Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis, where he studies elite politics, political economy, and foreign policy. Previously, he was a Senior Analyst for China and Northeast Asia at Eurasia Group.  Timestamps[01:32] Historical Significance of Foreign Affairs Work Conference[07:09] Xi’s Key Messages from the Conference in December[11:10] Xi’s Concept of the Community of Common Destiny[15:26] Major Country Diplomacy in Chinese Foreign Policy[20:03] China’s Diplomacy Going Forward[23:07] Xi’s Speech to Chinese Ambassadors 

On January 13, 2024, voters in Taiwan elected the DPP’s Lai Ching-te the next president of Taiwan. Lai won 40% of the votes–a plurality, but not a majority. In his acceptance speech, Lai pledged to safeguard Taiwan from continuing threats and intimidation from China. He also said that he has an important responsibility to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and reiterated a statement that the current president, Tsai Ing-wen, made 8 years ago: that he would act in accordance with the Republic of China constitutional order.Beijing expected that Lai would win and was therefore well prepared. The statement, issued by the Taiwan Affairs Office shortly after the final tally was announced, emphasized that the election result would not change the trend of cross-Strait relations and said that reunification remained inevitable. It also warned against Taiwan independence and foreign interference. This episode focuses on China’s perspectives on the election and its likely reaction going forward. Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Rick Waters, who is managing director of Eurasia Group’s China practice. He has served 27 years as a career diplomat, most recently as the inaugural head of the State Department’s Office of China Coordination and Deputy Secretary of State for China and Taiwan. Time Stamps[01:56] Interpreting Beijing’s Statements[03:40] Views of the State Security Ministry[04:38] Poaching Taiwan’s Diplomatic Ally Nauru[06:53] Threat of Tariff Imposition[08:37] Impact of Woodside Summit on Beijing’s Response[10:02] What role do the Chinese want the Americans to play?[11:13] Assessing the Efficacy of Chinese Policy Toward Taiwan[13:40] Unofficial American Delegation Visiting Taiwan[15:02] Post-Election Comment from President Biden[16:26] Clarifying the US One-China Policy[19:48] Xi Jinping’s Statements to Biden about Taiwan[23:14] Is reunification a legacy issue for Xi Jinping?[24:49] What are the most important variables moving forward?[27:00] China and Peaceful Unification

This episode covers the role of US and Chinese domestic politics in the US-China relationship. There are many drivers of US-China strategic competition, and domestic politics is among them, and has become increasingly important, though it has not been well researched and analyzed in recent years. One reason for the lack of analysis on Chinese politics is that since Xi Jinping became China’s top leader in 2012, domestic politics in China has become even more of black box than previously. Bonnie is joined by Dr. Evan Medeiros, who has recently published a pathbreaking study that seeks to update the understanding of political forces in China and the United States that are influencing the bilateral relationship. Medeiros is one of the world’s leading experts on Chinese foreign policy. He is the Penner Family Chair in Asia studies and the Cling Family Distinguished Fellow in US-China Studies in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. The report we will discuss today is titled: "The New Domestic Politics of US-China Relations" and was published by the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis where Evan is a senior fellow for foreign policy. During the Obama administration, Evan was on the NSC staff, first as director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia, and then as special assistant to the president and Senior Director for Asia.  Timestamps[02:14] Influence of Domestic Politics in the US and China[03:32] Differences between US and Chinese Domestic Politics[05:19] Weakening of Historical Forces for Stability[08:35] Most Important Driver of Change to America’s China Policy[13:34] Xi Jinping Shaping Domestic Politics in China[19:38] Reversing the Downward Trend in US-China Relations[21:44] Close Connections between Domestic and Foreign Politics[24:49] Biden and Xi as Leaders in the Bilateral Relationship

This podcast episode is a joint and cross-over episode between the CSIS ChinaPower Podcast and the German Marshall Fund’s China Global Podcast. We are joined by Bonnie Glaser, Jessica Chen Weiss, and Thomas Christensen to discuss their recently released article titled “Taiwan and the True Sources of Deterrence.” The authors underline the article’s key point, that assurances, alongside threats, are an integral part of effective deterrence. They emphasize that in order for deterrence to work, the threat of punishment must be not only credible but also conditional. Finally, the authors outline what actions each of the three actors- the U.S., China, and Taiwan- should take to effectively convey assurances to one another.Ms. Bonnie Glaser is the managing director of the German Marshall Fund’s Indo-Pacific program. She is also a nonresident fellow with the Lowy Institute in Sydney, Australia, and a senior associate with the Pacific Forum. She was previously senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at CSIS. Ms. Glaser has worked at the intersection of Asia-Pacific geopolitics and U.S. policy for more than three decades.Dr. Jessica Chen Weiss is a professor for China and Asia-Pacific Studies in the Department of Government at Cornell University. She was previously an assistant professor at Yale University and founded the Forum for American/Chinese Exchange at Stanford University. Formerly, Dr. Weiss served as senior advisor to the Secretary’s Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. State Department on a Council on Foreign Relations Fellowship for Tenured International Relations Scholars.Dr. Thomas Christensen is a professor of Public and International Affairs and Director of the China and World Program at Columbia University. Prior to this, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs with responsibility for relations with China, Taiwan, and Mongolia. His research and teaching focus is on China’s foreign relations, the international relations of East Asia, and international security. 

Early next month, the European Union and China are set to hold the 24th bilateral summit. The last EU-China summit was held via video conference in April 2022. It took place against the background of China’s countermeasures to EU sanctions on human rights, Chinese economic coercion and trade measures against the single market, and most importantly, Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine and Beijing’s unwillingness to condemn the invasion. Earlier this year, the European Council reaffirmed the EU’s multifaceted policy approach towards China, which is based on the judgment that China is simultaneously a partner, a competitor, and a systemic rival. However, that balancing act is getting more and more difficult.Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Mr. Gunnar Wiegand, who has recently retired from the post of Managing Director for Asia and the Pacific at the European External Action Service, which he held for 7 ½ years. He is now a visiting professor at the College of Europe and the Paris School of International Affairs, and as of November 1, 2023, he has joined GMF’s Indo-Pacific program as a visiting distinguished fellow.  Timestamps[01:39] EU-China Relations on the Eve of the 24th Bilateral Summit[05:13] Impact of the War in Ukraine on EU-China Relations[07:29] How could China alleviate concerns in Europe? [09:33] De-risking in the European Union[15:27] Proportionate and Precise Economic Security[18:27] How similar are EU and US perceptions of China?[22:13] The EU’s Stance on Taiwan[26:19] How can EU contribute to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait?[27:21] Outcomes of the Biden-Xi Summit

On the morning of October 07, 2023, Hamas launched an unprovoked attack from the Gaza Strip, indiscriminately killing more than 1,400 Israeli and foreign nationals. Over 200 civilians, including women and children, were taken to Gaza as hostages. IN response to this attack, as well as subsequent attacks launched from Lebanon and Syria, Israel began an unprecedented bombing campaign of Gaza and targeted Hezbollah and Syrian government military positions. The conflict is unlikely to end soon and may spread.While the conflict itself demands global attention, the focus of this podcast is Chinese foreign and security policy. This discussion focuses on China’s response to the war, China’s relations with Palestine and Israel, and the actions that Beijing might take in the coming weeks and months that could help defuse the conflict or cause it to worsen.To date, China has not condemned Hamas. Instead, it has criticized what it calls Israel’s disproportionate military response and the “collective punishment of the Gazan people.” Moreover, it has trumpeted its position as an unbiased potential mediator and called for a ceasefire and the implementation of a two-state solution.Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Tuvia Gering, who, like many Israelis, has been activated to defend his country. Gering is a leading expert on China and its relations with the Middle East. In his civilian capacity, he is a researcher at the Diane & Guilford Glazer Foundation’s Israel-China Policy Center at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv and a nonresident fellow for the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. Timestamps[02:25] China’s Past Relationships with Israel and Palestine[03:43] Reaction to the Chinese Response [05:06] China’s Interests in Supporting Palestine[09:06] China’s Reaction to the Death of Chinese Citizens[10:55] Benefits of a Wider Conflict for China [15:02] Comparisons to the War in Ukraine[17:54] China as a Mediator for the War[20:55] Antisemitism in Chinese Society[25:35] Outcome of the War for China

On August 1, 2017, China official opened its first overseas military base in the East African nation of Djibouti. The base, constructed to provide logistical support to the Chinese navy’s counter-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia, marked a major step toward Xi Jinping’s goal of constructing a world class military by the middle of the century.The US Defense Department has just released its annual China Military Power Report, and that says that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) probably has also considered adding military logistics facilities in 19 countries around the world (in addition to Djibouti): Cambodia, Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, Nigeria, Namibia, Mozambique, Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Tajikistan. To expand its global footprint, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will need to cultivate good relations with potential host countries. China’s military diplomacy is likely aimed at achieving that objective among others.Today’s discussion focuses on the key features and goals of China’s military diplomacy and its quest for additional military installations – or what the Chinese call “strategic strongpoints.” Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Kristin Gunness, a senior policy researcher at the RAND Corporation. She previously served as the Director of the Navy Asia Pacific Advisory Group at the Pentagon, advising the Chief of Naval Operations on security and foreign policy trends in the Indo-Pacific, focusing on Chinese naval and gray zone warfare capabilities. Earlier this year, Kristin testified on China’s overseas military diplomacy and its implications for American interests at a hearing convened by the US Economic and Security Review Commission.  Timestamps[02:20] Introduction to Military Diplomacy[04:36] Three Objectives of Chinese Military Diplomacy[06:15] China’s Regions of Interest[08:48] Gauging the Success of China’s Military[11:46] Beijing’s Broader Geo-Political Strategy[13:47] Challenges Posed to US Interests[15:53] Military Installations Versus Commercial Ports[17:20] Potential Chinese Presence in Cambodia [19:27] Potential Chinese Presence in Equatorial Guinea [21:41] Beijing’s Assessment of their Military Diplomacy[23:33] Recommendations for a US Response

On this episode of the China Global podcast, the relationship between the Philippines and China, and some of the flashpoints therein (especially in the maritime realm), will be discussed. Since taking office in June 2022, President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. has pursued a strategy of “being a friend to all and an enemy to none.” He has tried to maintain close economic ties with China, signing 14 cooperation agreements when he visited Beijing last January, including an updated Belt and Road Initiative memorandum. He secured over $22 billion in investment and trade deals. But the maritime disputes between the Philippines and China are becoming more contentious, and Manila is pushing back against Chinese pressure in new ways.  Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Richard Heydarian to analyze the bilateral relationship and especially the maritime flashpoints. Heydarian is a columnist at the Philippine Daily Inquirer, a Senior Lecturer at the University of the Philippines, and a policy adviser. His most recent book is The Indo-Pacific: Trump, China, and the New Global Struggle for Mastery. Timestamps[01:36] Changes in Sino-Phillipine Relations[09:05] Tensions Between the Chinese Coast Guard and Philippine Ships[14:23] Pushing Back Against China[20:55] China, the Philippines, and the Warship[25:05] Future Relations with China[29:30] The Philippines and a Taiwan Strait Conflict  

In late August, China’s Ministry of Natural Resources released its new “standard map,” which includes not only Taiwan, but also parts of the maritime zones of the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia. It also includes land that China disputes with India—and even some Russian territory. To publicize the map and China’s claims, Beijing launched a “national map awareness publicity week,” as it has for map releases in recent years. China’s map release is an annual event, which can happen at any time. So why now? And what does the map tell us about Chinese foreign policy under Xi Jinping? To discuss this topic, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Collin Koh who is Senior Fellow at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, based in Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He has research interests on naval affairs in the Indo-Pacific, focusing on Southeast Asia.  Timestamps[01:29] How does this map differ from previous ones?[04:44] Interagency Coordination on Release[05:51] Reaction of the Chinese Foreign Ministry [08:12] Significance of the Timing of the Release[11:32] Protests Against the Map’s Release[15:09] Portrayal of the South China Sea[19:35] Ambiguity of Beijing’s Claims [23:44] Territorial Claims Along the Sino-Russian Border[26:58] Lasting Impact of the Map 

In 2001, Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill coined the term “BRIC” to describe the fast-growing economies that he predicted would collectively dominate the global economy by 2050. The BRIC countries he was referring to were Brazil, Russia, India, and China. After a series of high-level meetings that included officials from the four countries, the BRIC grouping was founded in 2009. The following year, South Africa joined, and the name became “BRICS”. Last month, the fifteenth BRICS summit was held in Johannesburg. In addition to the leaders of the five core countries, representatives from more than 60 countries attended, and six were officially invited to join the club: Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.How does the BRICS serve China’s foreign policy objectives? And is this expansion a major win for Xi Jinping? Is BRICS likely to become a global grouping of authoritarian countries that poses a challenge to the G-7 group of democracies – and is that what Beijing wants? To discuss these topics and more, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Colleen Cottle, deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. Prior to joining the Atlantic Council, she spent over a dozen years at the Central Intelligence Agency where she worked on East and South Asia.  Timestamps[01:45] What has BRICS achieved? [05:33] China Driving the BRICS Agenda[08:35] Where does BRICS fit into China’s foreign policy agenda? [10:53] Why has BRICS refrained from endorsing BRI?[12:53] Outcomes of Johannesburg Summit[15:18] Criteria for Expanding BRICS Membership[18:19] Potential for BRICS Disrupting the International Order[23:52] China as a Developing Country[26:56] Will we see any breakthroughs with BRICS?  

Earlier this summer, there was an unexpected shakeup in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force. Commander Li Yuchao was removed along with his deputy Liu Guangbin and a former deputy Zhang Zhenzhong. All three men are reportedly under investigation for disciplinary violations by the Central Military Commission’s anti-corruption unit. Xi Jinping appointed Wang Houbin, former deputy commander of the navy, as head of the Rocket Force, and Xu Xiesheng, from the air force as political commissar. The PLA’s Rocket Force, established on January 1, 2016, is the successor to the Second Artillery Corps. It has responsibility for China’s growing arsenal of land-based ballistic and cruise missiles, both nuclear and conventional. What is the significance of this reshuffle in the PLA’s most sensitive branch? What implications do the appointments of new commanders from other parts of the military have for PLA readiness and preparations for a Taiwan invasion scenario? To discuss these questions, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Phillip Saunders, Director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs and a Distinguished Research Fellow at the National Defense University’s Institute of National Strategic Studies. Dr. Saunder’s most recent publication is a study he conducted with David Logan on the drivers of China’s nuclear force development. The views he expresses today are his own and do not represent the National Defense University or the US Department of Defense.Timestamps[01:58] Unpacking the Shakeup [04:19] Launch-on-Warning Posture[05:34] Rooting out Corruption[09:00] Concerns of Loyalty [10:40] Inexperienced Leadership[14:58] Naval Leadership of Rocket Force[17:32] Viability of Invading Taiwan[19:06] System for Military Governance[21:38] Nuclear Force Development[29:00] US-China Nuclear Dialogue  

Technology is the focus of the intensifying competition between the United States and China, and Artificial Intelligence (AI) is at the core. China views AI as a means to gain a strategic advantage over the United States and its allies. It intends to use AI to build a world-class military. Beijing also views AI as an enabler of surveillance and repression that can help to bolster its illiberal model of governance. China’s national AI strategy calls for a vast expansion of AI in manufacturing, governance, and national defense, with China becoming a global leader in the field by 2030 through multiple AI technology innovations and personnel training centers. To discuss this topic, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Gregory Allen, director of the Wadhwani Center for AI and Advanced Technologies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Before joining CSIS, he was the director of strategy and policy at the Department of Defense (DOD) Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, where he oversaw development and implementation of the DOD’s AI Strategy, drove policy and human capital reforms to accelerate the DOD’s adoption of AI, and developed mechanisms for AI governance and ethics. Timestamps[01 :37] Centrality of AI in US-China Competition[04 :21] China’s Strengths and Weaknesses[06 :20] Progress in the Field of AI[09 :54] Reducing the Risk of Military AI Accidents[13 :37] Discussing AI with the Chinese Government[16 :11] Biden Administration’s Export Controls on AI[21 :31] Reducing Dependency on the West[24 :15] Collaborating on AI Regulation[27 :25] Who will spearhead the next Technological Revolution?

Critical minerals are non-fuel minerals or mineral materials essential to the economic or national security of the U.S. They have no viable substitutes yet face a high risk of supply chain disruption. Critical minerals are used for many different purposes, including the production of advanced electronics, weapons systems, manufacturing equipment, and cutting-edge medical devices. They are indispensable for the transition to low-carbon energy sources. Last year, the U.S. Secretary of the Interior, with the aid of the U.S. Geological Survey, published a list of 50 critical minerals. China dominates global critical mineral supply chains, accounting for approximately 60% of world-wide production and 85% of processing capacity. However, the U.S. and several European countries are taking steps to build out their own ability to mine, process, and manufacture critical minerals. To discuss the implications of China’s role in critical mineral supply chains and the responses of the U.S. and its partners, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Abigail Wulf, vice president and director of the Ambassador Alfred Hoffman Jr. Center for Critical Minerals Strategy at Securing America’s Future Energy (SAFE), a non-profit advancing transformative transportation technology to enhance energy security. Time Stamps[01:51] Vulnerabilities and Risks of Overdependence [07:07] Development of a Domestic Mining Industry [12:42] Environmental Hazards of Processing Raw Minerals [18:30] Impact of Export Controls on Gallium and Germanium[22:53] Diversifying Sources of Rare Earth Imports[26:38] The Critical Raw Materials Act[29:58] The Mineral Security Partnership

SummaryA new Foreign Relations Law took effect in China on July 1, 2023 that formalizes Chinese Communist Party leadership in all foreign policy matters. It puts China’s security and development interests and global rise at the center of its engagement with the world. The new law has been widely interpreted as providing a legal basis for Beijing’s struggle against what it says is a strategy of containment by the United States and its allies, and against foreign interference and sanctions, as well as what is calls America’s “long-arm jurisdiction.” To discuss the Foreign Relations Law, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Moritz Rudolf, a Research Scholar in Law and Fellow at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center, where he focuses on the implications of China’s rise for the international legal order. Timestamps[01:15] Impetus for the Foreign Relations Law[02:47] Centralized and Unified Leadership of Foreign Relations[04:27] China and Reforming the International Order[09:20] How might China use the foreign relations law?[11:03] Insurance Against International Courts[12:31] Targeting a Domestic Audience[15:10] Expected Policy Changes in China[17:30] Applicability of the Law in Cross-Strait Relations[21:57] Forecasting Chinese Use of Lawfare

Relations between the United States and China have slid to their lowest point since the 1970s. After President Biden and Xi Jinping met in November 2022, they instructed their senior officials to initiate a process to stabilize the relationship. Before much headway could be made, however, China sent a surveillance balloon to the west coast of the United States that ended up loitering over sensitive military sites and then flew across the entire country before being shot down by the US. Secretary of State Blinken postponed his planned visit to China. Acrimony and distrust spiked.  Several months later, the US and China decided to try again. Blinken visited Beijing from June 18-19, and had meetings with Chinese President Xi Jinping, CCP Central Foreign Affairs Office Director Wang Yi, and State Councilor and Foreign Minister Qin Gang. What is the trajectory of the bilateral relationship after the visit? Is it possible to stabilize ties and resume dialogue mechanisms and some forms of cooperation, or is further deterioration of relations more likely? To discuss these issues, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Evan Medeiros, the Penner Family Chair in Asia Studies in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, and the Cling Family Distinguished Fellow in U.S.-China Studies. During the Obama administration, Evan served for six years on the National Security Council as Director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia. Timestamps[01:45] US-China Relations at this Juncture[05:10] Deterioration of US-China Relations[08:30] Analysis of Secretary Blinken’s Visit[10:40] Principles Guiding US-China Relations[13:16] Is agreement on principles a precondition for progress?[13:48] Is the US-China relationship dominated by competition?[16:45] Top-Down Pressure to Deny Competition[18:30] Displacing the United States[19:50] Where Blinken’s Visit Fell Short[22:48] Putting a Floor Under the Relationship[24:46] Interpreting Evolving Sino-Russian Relations[28:15] China’s Initial Reaction to the War in Ukraine[29:24] Forecast for US-China Relations                                                                                 [31:57] Incentives for Stability 

On June 3, 2023, there was a near-collision between a US and a PRC destroyer in the Taiwan Strait. According to a statement issued by US Indo-Pacific Command, a US Navy destroyer, the USS Chung-Hoon, and a Canadian warship were conducting a routine south to north Taiwan Strait transit through waters where high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight apply. The Luyang III, a People’s Liberation Army destroyer, overtook the Chung-Hoon on her port side and crossed her bow at 150 yards. The US warship maintained course and slowed to 10 knots to avoid a collision. US Indo-Pacific Command stated that the actions of the Chinese destroyer violated the maritime Rules of the Road of safe passage in international waters.How dangerous was this incident? Why do US warships sail in these waters, and do they do so in accordance with international law? And what steps should be taken to ensure that accidents do not take place between US and Chinese naval vessels?To discuss these questions, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Peter Dutton, professor of international law in the Stockton Center for International Law at the US Naval War College and an Adjunct Professor of Law at New York University School of Law. His research focuses on international law of the sea, Chinese views of sovereignty and international law, and China’s maritime expansion.  Timestamps[01:50] Freedom of the High Seas [03:21] Joint Freedom of Navigation Operations[03:52] Statement by the US Indo-Pacific Command[04:46] Statement by Defense Minister Li Shangfu[06:49] History of Dangerous Maneuvering by the Chinese[07:41] Trigger for the Recent Dangerous Maneuver[09:13] Chinese Adherence to International Law[10:19] Signaling Intentions in a Safe and Legal Manner[12:03] Aftermath of a Hypothetical Collision at Sea[14:44] Is the US Goading China into Conflict?[17:38] Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters[19:24] Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea[20:27] The US and the Convention on the Law of the Sea[21:51] Interactions with Chinese Experts and Professionals

[01:50] Switzerland’s Policy toward China Today[03:48] Changes in Swiss-Chinese Relations[06:03] Switzerland’s 2021 China Strategy[08:17] Areas of Economic Cooperation[11:05] Switzerland’s Relationship with Taiwan[14:45] Switzerland’s One China Policy[17:32] Contending with Human Rights Issues[18:55] Huawei’s Presence in Switzerland[20:56] China’s Influence in Switzerland[23:42] Forecast of Swiss-Chinese Relations

Timestamps[01:30] Sinocentric Order in the Digital Sphere[06:51] China’s Digital Silk Road [09:35] Global Rise of Chinese Digital Platforms[11:57] The Strength of Chinese Digital Platforms[14:04] The Digital Sector and Government Partnership[16:53] Dominance of Western Digital Platforms[19:08] Pros and Cons of Banning TikTok [21:08] Chinese Crackdown of the Digital Sector[23:27] Looking Forward in the Digital Space

Timestamps[02:01] China and International Bailout Activities[04:33] China and the G20 Common Framework[07:34] Debt Service Suspension Initiative[09:42] Definition of a “Haircut” in Finance[10:00] IMF and World Bank Spring Meetings[12:37] Beijing’s Demands for Write-Downs[16:18] Japan, India, and France Establishing a Creditors Committee[18:43] Chinese Participation in the Paris Club[22:08] Role of Geopolitical Competition in Debt Relief

Timestamps[02:14] China’s Implementation of Industrial Policy[05:20] Industrial Policy to Achieve Foreign Policy Objectives[08:02] Influence of Strategic Competition on Industrial Policy[10:42] Efficacy of Chinese Industrial Policies[14:17] Semiconductor Subsidies and Export Controls[19:06] Chinese Countermeasures to Export Controls[22:39] Assessment of U.S. Policy[25:58] Forecast of Competition on Advanced Technologies[29:50] Balance of Centralization and Adaptation

Time Stamps[01:39] Background of The Decoding China Dictionary[04:30] Democracy with Chinese Characteristics[06:34] Differing Interpretations of International Law[08:32] Freedom of Religion Versus Freedom of Religious Belief[10:28] Foreign Aid and China as a Developing Country[12:01] Security in Chinese Parlance[13:55] Transparency and its Uses in China[16:19] Historic Revisionism and Domestic Policy[18:39] Historic Revisionism and Foreign Policy[19:44] Promotion of Chinese Interpretations Internationally[23:52] Importance of Understanding Chinese Terminology

[02:10] Chinese Government Awareness of Illicit Domestic Narcotics[05:30] China’s Scheduling of Fentanyl in 2019[06:40] Difference Between Scheduling and Banning[09:50] Lack of Cooperation Between China and Mexico [14:18] Chinese Counternarcotics Cooperation in Southeast Asia[19:04] Possible Steps for China[22:56] A Looming Fentanyl Crisis in China?[25:43] Multilateral Approach to Counternarcotics

[02:16] The 14 Grievances[05:56] Canberra's New Rhetoric[07:54] Self-Censorship[11:12] Decision Making Tightrope[13:00] Darwin Port Lease[14:00] Foreign Investment Review Board[18:00] AUKUS Announcement in Washington[20:13] Australia and the Quad[23:19] Within the Albanese Government[27:05] Australia on Taiwan[31:21] America's China Policy

[02:28] China’s Objectives & Success in Africa[06:02] China’s Political Model & Engaging Political Elites[12:27] China-Africa Support at the UN[14:47] Declining Chinese Investments[16:04] Public Opinion and US-Chinese Competition[22:19] Debt Strains on Relations[25:45] Chinese Propaganda in Africa 

[00:00] Topic and Guest Introduction[02:31] Information Collection Capabilities[07:25] Chinese Motivations[10:40] Reaction to Shot Down Balloon[13:59] Mil-Mil Dialogue[16:59] Leverage Over China[19:15] Guidance from Past Incidents[22:08] Risk Reduction Measures[24:47] Balloon Incident and Xi Jinping[27:32] Wartime Use of Balloons

[01:59] Xi’s Relationship with Kim Jong-un[05:12] 1961 Treaty on Friendship[09:48] Chinese Economic Assistance[12:33] Impact of US-DPRK Negotiations[16:02] Sino-American Divergence on North Korea[21:05] A Seventh Nuclear Test[25:30] South Korean Nuclear Deterrence

[1:42] Xi Jinping’s Public Diplomacy at the G20 Summit[4:30] Qin Gang’s New Approaches  [5:50] Internal & External Pressures on China’s Behavior?[9:59] China-Australia Relations[15:32] Allyship & Challenges in Southeast Asia  [18:27] US-China Relations[23:48] Indicators of Changes to China's Foreign Policy

[01:34] China’s Interests in the Middle East[03:25] Chinese Engagement During the Past Decade[05:54] Xi’s Trip to Saudi Arabia[08:22] Security and the Sino-Middle Eastern Relationships[11:05] Role of Multilateral Institutions[14:09] Perceptions of Huawei[18:12] Perceptions of Xinjiang[22:39] The Sino-Iranian Relationship[26:24] China’s Role in Conflicts

[1:40] China’s Approach to Energy Security[4:45] Dependence on Russia’s Energy[14:08] Oil Partnerships with the Gulf[16:41] Decarbonization & Energy Security Goals[19:41] China’s Overseas Energy Investments [22:23] US-China Energy & Climate Change Cooperation

[2:20] UN Significance & China’s Objectives[8:25] China’s Veto Power[11:17] UN Security Council Reform[13:53] China’s Funding Contributions[18:13] China’s Leadership in UN Agencies[25:21] Influence on WHO & COVID-19[28:47] China’s Future Role in the UN

[01:26] Criticism of Scholz’s Trip[5:18] Scholz’s Trip Aspirations[8:40] German and European Perceptions of the trip[11:33] Xi Jinping’s Gains & Sino-German Relationship[13:20] Germany’s China Strategy[21:38] Germany’s Changing Taiwan Policy

[1:41] Xi Jinping’s Political Report: Main Themes [3:27] The International Environment and Implications[7:59] Taiwan[13:21] China’s Reform of the Global Governance System[16:23] The PLA and China’s Military Modernization[20:51] US-China Competition: Xi Jinping’s Approach Going Forward[23:48] Personnel Arrangements

[2:01] China’s Objectives in the Global Media Environment[5:22] Evolution of CCP’s Tactics, and Investments[8:22] Levels and Effectiveness of Chinese Media Influence[18:03] Approaches in Less/Non-Free Countries[20:02] Government, Civil Society, & Journalists’ Resilience[26:29] Erosion of Governance 

[2:21] Shanghai Five and the SCO [6:22] Takeaways from Xi Jinping’s Visit to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan[10:16] Russia-China Dynamic in Central Asia[15:07] Public Attitudes Toward China[17:34] Xinjiang and Government Responses[19:08] China’s Approach to Central Asia’s Energy Resources[21:33] Turkey and Expanding SCO Membership

[1:28] China's Dominance in Global Supply Chains[3:50] Role of China's Industrial Policy[9:08] Implications of Variables Affecting Supply Chains[13:37] US Policy Response and the CHIPS Act[20:36] Made in China 2025[24:54] Economic Coercion, Vulnerabilities, and an Effective Response

[1:38] Beijing's Goals and Signals[5:43] People’s Liberation Army and Advanced Planning[7:20] A New Normal?[11:44] Learning from the Recent Drills[13:58] China’s Interpretation of US Response[16:40] Mobilization, Confidence, and Capabilities[26:43] US Congress’ Taiwan Policy Act and China’s Reactions

[1:51] Beijing’s Objectives[5:43] China’s Vision for the International Order[8:49] GSI’s Relation to US-China Competition[10:45] "Meat and Bones" over Time[14:47] “Indivisible Security”[16:37] India and Others' Perspectives on GSI[21:27] Sino-Russian Alignment: Implications for China’s Global Security Governance Ambitions? 

Episode Highlights:[1:30] Duterte’s China Policy[4:36] Change under the New Marcos Government?[6:53] Philippines’ Relations with the United States[8:45] Public Opinion in the Philippines toward China[14:10] Joint China-Philippines Energy Exploration Talks[17:15] Railway Projects Loan Agreements with China[19:14] Future Developments

China’s Global Development Initiative (GDI) was launched by President Xi Jinping on September 21, 2021. In a speech at the General Debate of the 76th Session of the UN General Assembly, Xi stated that, in the face of the severe shocks of the coronavirus pandemic, the world needed to work together to steer global development toward a new stage of balanced, coordinated, and inclusive growth. The GDI was meant to achieve those objectives as well as the United Nations' 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. A Group of Friends of the GDI was launched at the UN in January, and more than 55 countries have joined it to date.In today’s episode of China Global, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Yu Jie to discuss the GDI, which like most PRC initiatives, began as a bumper sticker and was described using vague and abstract language. Dr. Yu is a senior research fellow on China in the Asia-Pacific Program at Chatham House in London.[1:26] Beijing’s Objectives[5:54] GDI's Relation to the BRI[7:34] China's Resources into GDI[10:31] UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development[14:06] Group of Friends of the GDI and Interested Countries[20:04] Origin of the GDI

Lithuania-China relations is an interesting case study for how Beijing deals with small states and how it applies economic pressure on target countries to change policies that it views as damaging to Chinese interests. Tensions in Lithuania-China relations arise from numerous sources, including the decision by Vilnius to withdraw from the 17+1 mechanism between China and Central and Eastern European countries and its agreement to allow Taiwan to establish a representative office in Vilnius under the name Taiwanese Representative Office. In today’s episode of China Global, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Ambassador Diana Mickevičienė to discuss the drivers of the Lithuania-China friction as well as the circumstances surrounding her departure from China. Ambassador Mickevičienė currently serves as the Lithuanian ambassador to China, operating in exile from Vilnius.

On May 26, US Secretary of State Tony Blinken delivered a long-awaited speech on the Biden Administration’s approach to the People’s Republic of China. Separate from the speech itself, there is a China strategy document that remains classified. Blinken’s speech, which did not contain any surprises, introduced a new catchphrase for the Biden administration’s strategy toward China, the only country “with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.” This catchphrase, “invest, align, and compete,” has three key features: invest in American strength at home, align with our network of allies and partners, and rely on these two key assets to compete with China to defend our interests and build our vision for the future. In today’s episode of China Global, Dr. Evan Medeiros joins Bonnie Glaser to discuss the Biden Administration’s strategy toward China. Dr. Medeiros is the Penner Family Chair in Asia Studies in the School of Foreign Service and the Cling Family Distinguished Fellow in U.S.-China Studies at Georgetown University. He previously served in the Obama administration, where he served on the staff of the National Security Council as Director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia, and then as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Asia. [1:45] Objectives of the US-China Strategy under the Biden Administration[5:58] Differences between the Biden and the Trump Approach toward China[9:55] Beijing’s Response to Blinken’s May 26 Address and China’s Perception of the US[13:18] Potential Opportunities for Cooperation between the US and China[17:24] Critiques of the Biden Administration’s US-China Strategy[26:21] China’s Strategy toward the United States

South Korea’s President Yoon Suk-yeol formally began his five-year term on May 10, 2022. His predecessor, former president Moon Jae-in, attempted to strike a balance between ties with China and the United States during his term, but whether he was able to successfully advance South Korean interests is unclear. Concurrently, public attitude in South Korea toward China has continued to harden, as Yoon pledged to prioritize the country’s alliance with the United States. China’s relationship with North Korea also seemed to become more distant due in part to the pandemic, but despite this, Beijing has not criticized North Korea’s missile tests—it has only generally urged all parties to exercise restraint.To discuss China’s policy toward and relations with both North and South Korea, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Seong-hyon Lee, a visiting scholar at Harvard University’s Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies and a fellow at the George H.W. Bush Foundation for US-China Relations.Marker NotesChina's Relations with South Korea 1:51.442China's Response to Missile Tests 10:08.780China's Relationship with North Korea 14:02.939Looking Ahead 26:16.467

On April 19, the PRC signed an agreement with the Solomon Islands that has prompted concerns in the United States, New Zealand, and Australia about growing Chinese influence that some worry could lead to a Chinese military presence in the Solomons. The Pacific Islands countries are scattered over a broad expanse of ocean and are widely seen as strategically significant. Yet, the region only receives episodic attention from the United States and other leading countries. Beijing has stepped up its engagement in the region, and there is a pressing need to understand the nature of that engagement and its implications.In this episode, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Professor Anne-Marie Brady, professor at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand on China’s interests, activities, and role in the Pacific Islands as well as the recent deal between China and the Solomon Islands. Among other issues, Professor Brady is a specialist in Chinese politics and China-Pacific relations, and her groundbreaking work on Chinese interference in New Zealand and other countries is globally renowned.Marker Notes[1:44] China's Interests and Activities in the Pacific Islands[9:00] Recent Deal between China and the Solomon Islands[13:56] China-Pacific Relations[21:30] Attention from the United States

In this episode, Bonnie Glaser hosts Singapore’s Ambassador Bilahari Kausikan to discuss several international trends and their strategic significances. They discuss the implications of the war in Ukraine for the global order, particularly the Indo-Pacific, the consequences of growing strategic alignment between China and Russia, the possible endgame of the US-China strategic competition, and Southeast Asia’s future. Ambassador Kausikan is a former Ambassador-at-Large in Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Prior to this role, he served as the Second Permanent Secretary and then Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Ministry. He has held a variety of appointments during his career, including as Singapore's Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York and as Ambassador to the Russian Federation. Currently, Ambassador Kausikan serves as Chairman of the Middle East Institute, an institute affiliated with the National University of Singapore. 

Europe’s relations with China have been on a downward trajectory the past few years. The list for this decline is long: Europe’s concerns about human rights violations in Xinjiang, Chinese sanctions on EU parliamentarians, European uneasiness about PRC plans to dominate key strategic technologies, Chinese rebuff to international law in the South China Sea and its military pressure on Taiwan. Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine and the resulting civilian causalities further strained relations between China and the EU as Beijing abstained in the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly and blamed the conflict on the five waves of NATO expansion. On April 1, the 23rd EU-China summit took place via video conference. President of the European Council, Charles Michel, and President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, accompanied by High Representative Josep Borrell, met with Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang in the morning and Chinese President Xi Jinping in the afternoon. Borell later described the meeting as a dialogue of the deaf—the Chinese side had little interest in talking about the war in Ukraine, preferring to discuss shared EU and Chinese interests. In an effort to drive a wedge between the US and the EU, Xi also called on the EU to form its own perception of China and adopt an independent China policy. In this episode, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Janka Oertel, Director of the Asia Program at the European Council on Foreign Relations to further discuss the April 1 EU-China summit and analyze the overall EU-China relationship.

On March 25, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited India and met with India’s Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and National Security Adviser Ajit Doval, marking the first high-level visit by a Chinese official to India since the 2020 Galwan Valley incident in which both Chinese and Indian soldiers were killed. Since the 2020 incident, both militaries have ramped up troops, weapons deployments, and infrastructure in the disputed region. Arranged at the initiative of Beijing, Wang Yi’s visit took place against the background of the ongoing war in Ukraine, in which both China and India have adopted stances on Russia’s invasion that are at odds with those of the United States, Europe, and some countries in Asia. To discuss Wang Yi’s meetings in India and the trajectory of the bilateral China-India relationship, Bonnie Glaser will speak with Dr. Tanvi Madan, senior fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy and director of The India Project at Brookings Institution. She is author of the book “Fateful Triangle: How China Shaped US-India Relations during the Cold War.”

On the orders of Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, the Russians invaded Ukraine just after the close of the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing and a few weeks after Putin and Xi Jinping inked a sweeping joint statement that challenged the United States as a global power, opposed NATO enlargement, and condemned liberal democracy as a model for the world. To investigate China’s stance on the conflict and to better understand the interests that Beijing is trying to protect and advance in the Ukraine crisis, Bonnie Glaser will speak with Dr. Evan Feigenbaum, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he oversees research in Washington, Beijing, and New Delhi. Dr Feigenbaum previously held several roles in the State Department in the George W. Bush administration.

Link to the Arctic development white paper: 中国的北极政策-新华网 (xinhuanet.com)

Foreign press correspondents reporting in China experience a host of challenges—and not just because of the Covid-19 pandemic and China’s rigorous “zero COVID” policy. As the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China’s recently released annual report on media freedom details, foreign journalists in China are encountering increasingly stringent visa restrictions, harassment, surveillance, and risk of expulsion or even arrest.  Emily Feng joins Bonnie Glaser on China Global to discuss the challenges facing reporters in China today, as well as trends in Chinese society and Xi Jinping’s first ten years in power. Emily is NPR’s Beijing Correspondent after having previously worked for the Financial Times. She covers everything from semiconductors to girl bands and Chinese coal mines and has earned many awards, including a Human Rights Press Award and a Gracie Award for her coverage of the Covid-19 pandemic. 

The post-World War II international system was created primarily by liberal democracies committed to the rule of law, free markets, and universal human rights. They launched multilateral institutions to advance their shared values and norms. China has long said that it views the international system as unjust and unfair, but for a long time, it had little ability to change it. Today, China not only has the means, but its leader Xi Jinping—who is likely to get a third five-year term in power this fall at the 20th National Party Congress—may also have a vision for a radically altered international system. A new book called The World According to China makes the case for this proposition. Bonnie Glaser speaks with the book’s author, Dr. Elizabeth Economy, on China’s approach to the international system. Dr. Economy is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. She is currently on leave and is serving as senior advisor for China to the Secretary of Commerce. Views expressed are her own.

The Beijing Olympics will be held next month, and China faces both the challenge of Covid-19 spreading to several Chinese cities and growing criticism of its policy in Xinjiang, which has led some countries—including the United States—to declare diplomatic boycotts. Taking place in March, the National People’s Congress will have important implications for China’s economic policy, among other issues. Personnel rotations around the country are already beginning to take place and will continue throughout the year, as the Chinese Communist Party prepares for the all-important National Party Congress slated for the fall. Apart from bestowing a third five-year term in power to Xi Jinping, what else should we expect from the upcoming Party Congress? Jude Blanchette speaks with Bonnie Glaser on the key developments of 2022. He holds the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. His first book is China’s New Red Guards: The Return of Radicalism and the Rebirth of Mao Zedong.

China’s engagement with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean has grown significantly in the past decade. The Chinese government describes its cooperation with the region as focused on numerous areas: trade and investment, agriculture, energy, infrastructure, manufacturing, and technological innovation. Nineteen governments across Latin America and the Caribbean have joined Xi Jinping’s signature Belt and Road Initiative. Competition between China and Taiwan in the region remains fierce, with eight countries maintaining diplomatic relations with Taipei and the remaining 25 recognizing Beijing. Nicaragua was the latest to switch recognition to the PRC on December 9, 2021. US concerns about Chinese activities and objectives in the region are on the rise. In the final year of the Trump administration, the United States issued a strategic framework for the Western hemisphere, which included among its priorities countering economic aggression and malign political influence from external actors such as China. The 2021 Posture Statement of the US Southern Command warns that China is “seeking to establish global logistics and basing infrastructure in our hemisphere.” Dr. Evan Ellis joins Bonnie Glaser to discuss Chinese intentions, influence, and impact in Latin America and the Caribbean. He is a research professor of Latin American Studies at the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute and previously served in the State Department on the Policy Planning Staff.

Next February, the 2022 Winter Olympics are scheduled to be held in Beijing, the venue of the 2008 Summer Olympics. Preparation for the Games is well underway and China has said that it looks forward to welcoming the athletes; but due to the coronavirus pandemic, Beijing has banned foreign spectators, as did Japan when it hosted the 2020 Summer Olympics. As the 2022 Olympics near, several countries, including the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Canada, and Lithuania, have announced a diplomatic boycott of the competition, and others may do so as well. So far, all countries will allow their athletes to compete. The diplomatic boycotts are a response to concerns about China’s human rights practices, especially in Xinjiang, where at least one million Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities have been subject to involuntary detention in what China labels “reeducation camps.” Countries have very limited leverage over Chinese domestic human rights practices, and some argue that the Olympics provides a rare opportunity to voice the international community’s concerns in a way that could shine a spotlight on China’s human rights violations. In an August 2021 survey, just under half of Americans stated that they believe China’s human rights record should prevent it from hosting the 2022 Winter Olympics, while 33 percent were uncertain. Please note that this podcast was recorded just prior to the Biden administration’s announcement that it would not send officials to the Olympic Games. Bonnie Glaser talks with Susan Brownell about the upcoming Olympics and, more broadly, about the role of sports in China and what the Olympics means to the Chinese people and to the Chinese Communist Party. Dr. Susan Brownell is a professor of anthropology at the University of Missouri-St. Louis. She was a Fulbright Senior Researcher at Beijing Sport University and competed on the Chinese track and field team at the Chinese National College Games in 1986. She is also the author of Training the Body for China: Sports in the Moral Order of the People’s Republic.

The U.S.-China relationship is in unchartered waters. The bilateral frameworks and mechanisms that existed in the past are now widely seen as inadequate to address the current complex and contentious relationship. The Biden administration put forth a three-pronged approach to the bilateral relationship: being competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can be, and adversarial when it must be. The Chinese side emphasizes principles to guide the relationship, including mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation. Against this background, the two countries’ leaders, Joe Biden and Xi Jinping, held their first virtual meeting on November 16. They had previously held two phone calls since Biden’s inauguration. This meeting was intended to enable a comprehensive strategic discussion about how to manage the differences between the United States and China and how to proceed with cooperation where the interests of the two countries align. Presidents Biden and Xi talked for 3.5 hours. To discuss this meeting and its implications for the U.S.-China relationship, Dr. Da Wei joins Bonnie Glaser. Da Wei is a professor of international relations at Tsinghua University and a senior research fellow at Tsinghua’s Center for International Security and Strategy. He has worked in China’s think tank and university communities for more than two decades and is among China’s top experts on the United States and U.S.-China relations.

Nearly six decades ago, China became the world’s fifth nuclear weapons state, joining the United States, France, the U.K., and the Soviet Union. China’s nuclear warheads stockpile was estimated last year to be in the low 200s. By comparison, the U.S. stockpile of nuclear warheads was at 3,750 as of September 2020. But recent developments suggest that Beijing is now engaged in a significant expansion of its nuclear arsenal, and maybe modifying its nuclear strategy as well. In the past few months, there have been reports of the construction of new missile silo fields and tests of a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile that could potentially evade U.S. missile defense systems. The Pentagon now predicts that China could quadruple its stockpile of nuclear warheads by 2030. What is motivating China’s nuclear force expansion? And what should the United States do to respond to China’s nuclear build-up? Dr. Fiona Cunningham joins Bonnie Glaser to discuss China’s evolving nuclear forces, its strategy, and how the United States might engage with China to mitigate the risk of conflict. Dr. Cunningham is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania and has published research on China’s nuclear strategy, U.S.-China strategic stability, and escalation dynamics in the nuclear domain.

After the Trump administration pulled out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2017, the trade agreement’s future was uncertain. Fortunately, Japan grabbed the baton and took it across the finish line in a slightly revised form and renamed the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The agreement was signed in 2018 by the remaining 11 countries in the Indo-Pacific and the Americas, accounting for 13 percent of world GDP. The CPTPP’s high degree of market access—alongside other digital, labor, and environmental provisions—has earned it the reputation as “one of the broadest and most state-of-the-art trade agreements ever signed.” On September 16, 2021, China formally applied to join the CPTPP after nearly a year of hinting at its interest in membership. Observers still have many questions about its eligibility to meet the CPTPP’s high standards and there is an ongoing debate about whether and under what terms it should be included. Many also wonder when—or even if—the United States will consider rejoining the agreement. Bonnie Glaser speaks with Wendy Cutler about China’s bid to join the CPTPP. Wendy Cutler is vice president and managing director of the Washington D.C. office at the Asia Society Policy Institute. Wendy previously worked at the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative for nearly three decades, most recently serving as the acting deputy U.S. trade representative.

In 1990, China’s greenhouse gas emissions were less than a quarter of developing country emissions. In 2019, almost 3 decades later, China’s annual emissions exceeded those of all developed countries combined. In per capita terms, however, China’s carbon emissions are considerably less than the US and other developed countries. China is under growing global pressure to take steps to reduce its emissions. Last year at the UN General Assembly, Xi Jinping pledged “to peak [China’s] carbon dioxide emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060.” At this year’s UNGA meeting, Xi said China would “not build new coal-fired power projects abroad.” On October 31st the 26th UN Climate Change Conference of the Parties, or COP26, will be held in Glasgow, Scotland. Will Xi Jinping make additional pledges? How should we evaluate China’s commitments so far, and why does Beijing seek to be a global leader on climate change? Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Joanna Lewis about China’s prospects at COP26 and the country’s broader climate agenda. Dr. Joanna Lewis is an Associate Professor and Director of the Science, Technology, and International Affairs Program at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service.

In a decades-long effort to expand its international “circle of friends,” the PRC has persisted in supplementing its national-level diplomacy with local exchanges. Over the past four decades, the PRC has forged more than 2000 sister-city relationships worldwide, including over 200 in the United States and over 350 in the EU. China forms these ties across the world through the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, a United Front organization that specializes in developing relationships with local business, political, and media figures abroad. But sister cities are only one of many avenues for Beijing to engage with local actors in order to realize its global aspirations. Bonnie Glaser talks with Dr. Mareike Ohlberg about China’s strategy of local diplomacy and its importance in an environment of increasingly tense national-level relations. Dr. Mareike Ohlberg is a senior fellow with GMF’s Asia Program. Her research interests include China’s media and digital policies as well as the Chinese Communist Party’s influence campaigns in Europe. Mareike is co-author of the book Hidden Hand: Exposing How the Chinese Communist Party is Reshaping the World.

Eight years since the introduction of the Belt and Road Initiative, President Xi Jinping’s hallmark foreign policy has gone global, making significant inroads into the developing world. Of the 140 bilateral BRI MoU’s signed between the People’s Republic of China and its partners, 85 of them have been with countries in Latin America, the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and the Pacific. In some ways, the BRI formalizes the PRC’s pre-existing trade and investment practices in these regions. However, the initiative also reflects a more ambitious phase in Beijing's economic strategy in the developing world. And to date, the United States and its allies are still in search of an effective multilateral response. Can alternative economic initiatives like the Blue Dot Initiative and the G7’s recently introduced Build Back Better World (B3W) compete with the BRI in developing nations? Bonnie Glaser talks with Matt Ferchen about China’s economic strategy in the developing world. Dr. Matt Ferchen is the Head of Global China Research at the Mercator Institute for China Studies in Berlin. His research interests include Chinese economic statecraft, the Belt and Road Initiative in developing nations, and U.S.-China relations.

Ties between Moscow and Beijing continue their upward trajectory, with their bilateral cooperation expanding across a broad range of areas. In the wake of the withdrawal of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan, Russia and China are coordinating their policies. This past June, NATO expressed concern about Chinese-Russian military cooperation and their joint exercises in the Euro-Atlantic area. While the United States and virtually all its allies are criticizing numerous Chinese policies, Russian President Vladimir Putin told Xi Jinping in a phone call a few weeks ago that he supports China’s legitimate actions to safeguard its interests on issues related to Taiwan, Hong Kong, Xinjiang and the South China Sea, and said he opposes any external interference in China’s domestic affairs. Bonnie Glaser talks with Alexander Gabuev about Sino-Russian relations and the reactions of and the implications for the United States and Europe. Alexander Gabuev is a senior fellow and the chair of the Russia in the Asia-Pacific Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center. His research is focused on Russia’s policy toward East and Southeast Asia, political and ideological trends in China, and China’s relations with its neighbors—especially those in Central Asia.

In 2014, Xi Jinping established the China National Security Commission (CNSC) and was appointed its head by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo. A year later, Xi stated that China “should attach equal importance to internal and external security.” Under his direction, the CCP has created a unified national security system based on Xi’s concept of comprehensive national security. That concept has evolved to include at least 16 forms of security, including military, territorial, technological, ecological, societal, polar, cyber, space, cultural, political, economic, bio, deep sea, resource, nuclear, and overseas interests. It is no exaggeration to say that national security tops Xi Jinping’s agenda. Bonnie Glaser talks with Dr. Sheena Chestnut Greitens about China’s concept of national security under Xi Jinping and the linkages between domestic security trends and Chinese foreign policy. Dr. Greitens is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas, Austin. Her research interests include East Asia, American national security, and authoritarian politics and foreign policy.

On August 10th, the People’s Republic of China recalled its ambassador to Lithuania and demanded Vilnius recall its representative to Beijing. The reason? Lithuania’s decision to allow Taipei to open a representative office in Vilnius under the name "Taiwanese Representative Office." Sino-Lithuanian relations started deteriorating in 2019. That year, Vilnius identified Chinese espionage as a threat to its national security. Since then, Lithuania has opposed the Hong Kong National Security Law at the UN Human Rights Council, withdrawn from the China-led 17+1 grouping, and criticized PRC policies in Xinjiang. In the meantime, Vilnius’ ties with Taiwan are warming. The new coalition government in Vilnius announced in November 2020 that it would follow a values-based foreign policy. Leaders pledged to “oppose any violation of human rights and democratic freedoms…from Belarus to Taiwan.” In addition to Taiwan’s plans to open a diplomatic mission in Vilnius, Lithuania will open its own trade office in Taipei this fall. Bonnie Glaser talks with Dr. Konstantinas Andrijauskas about the drivers of Lithuania’s recent policy shifts, Chinese interests in the region, and the potential for future Lithuania-Taiwan cooperation. Dr. Andrijauskas is an Associate Professor of International Relations at Vilnius University’s Institute of International Relations and Political Science. His research focuses on China’s domestic and foreign policies and the political systems and international relations of Asia.

After two decades of military involvement in Afghanistan, the United States and NATO are withdrawing their forces, with potential implications for regional security and thus for Chinese interests. Some observers have suggested the U.S. withdrawal will create opportunities for China to fill the void, but in fact, Beijing is worried about the potential negative security and economic impact of the U.S. pull-out. China has several major investments in Afghanistan, including in the Aynak Copper Mine and in the Amu Darya Basin Oil Fields. The Taliban has said it would welcome Chinese investments and reconstruction, but the Taliban’s rapidly growing influence has alarmed the Chinese government. An explosion that killed nine Chinese workers in Pakistan in mid-July, which Beijing has said was a terrorist attack, has further heightened Chinese fears of regional instability. Bonnie Glaser talks with Andrew Small about China’s interests, strategy, and future role in Afghanistan on this episode of China Global. Andrew is a senior transatlantic fellow with GMF’s Asia Program and author of The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics. His research focuses on U.S.-China relations, Europe-China relations, Chinese policy in South Asia, and broader developments in China's foreign and economic policy.

Chinese companies are investing in ports that are strategically located along sea lanes of communication, connecting China to resources and markets that are vital for China’s economy. These ports, called “strategic strongpoints” by Chinese military writers, can be found all over the world—in Europe, the Americas, and countries situated adjacent to the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, and the Horn of Africa. A growing number of observers believe that these commercial ventures will eventually become dual-use facilities or even military bases that will enable the Chinese navy to project power further from its shores. In this episode of China Global, Bonnie speaks with Dr. Isaac Kardon to discuss China’s growing role in port construction and operation and its potential strategic implications. Dr. Kardon is an assistant professor in the Strategic and Operational Research Department in the China Maritime Studies Institute at the US Naval War College. He specializes in China’s maritime disputes, Indo-Pacific maritime security and commerce, and Chinese firms’ overseas port projects.

A few months ago, China became the second country to successfully land on Mars. Since then, its Zhurong rover has sent back captivating panoramic images of the red planet. Meanwhile, China is building its own space station, which will rival the International Space Station (which Beijing was barred from in 2011) once completed next year. Last month, three Chinese astronauts arrived at the Tiangong station for a three-month stint; and just this weekend, the astronauts performed the country’s first tandem spacewalk. China’s ambitions don’t just reach beyond its borders – they reach far beyond this planet. In this episode of China Global, Bonnie sits down with Dr. Namrata Goswami to explore Beijing’s activities and ambitions in outer space, its cooperation in this domain with Russia and Europe, and the absence of collaboration with the U.S. Dr. Goswami is an author, strategic analyst, and consultant who focuses on great power competition and security in space. She is currently working on two book projects on space power and China’s grand strategy.

Earlier this year, China and Iran signed a 25-year strategic cooperation agreement outlining plans for economic, political, and security cooperation. On paper, the agreement appears ambitious. Some experts warn that it signals closer ties between Beijing and Tehran at the expense of the United States and its partners. But others caution that this should not be read as a major shift in China’s overall approach to Iran or the Middle East--noting that obtaining technology from Israel and oil from Saudi Arabia is too important for Beijing. As the two countries mark fifty years of relations, Bonnie is joined by Dr. William Figueroa to dive deeper into the history of Sino-Iranian ties, what each side wants out of their bilateral relationship, and what this quarter-century agreement really means for the balance of power in the Middle East and the rest of the world. Dr. Figueroa is an expert on the China in the Middle East, and holds a Ph.D. in history from the University of Pennsylvania where he wrote his dissertation on the history of Sino-Iranian relations from the early 1900s to the foundation of the Islamic Republic.

As the pandemic spread last year, the provision of life-saving supplies – PPE, ventilators, medicines, and eventually, vaccines -- quickly became intensely political. Pandemic response became not only a matter of life and death, but also of global reputation and influence. For China and Russia in particular, the distribution of supplies became a new front for flexing soft power. As early as April 2020, Xi Jinping made his plans known to treat China’s vaccines as global goods. And observers speculate that Beijing is using good will to mask a bigger geopolitical play: to press its interests on controversial issues like Taiwan and Huawei in exchange for desperately needed relief. What are China’s tactics and goals, and how have they evolved over the course of the pandemic? Will vaccine efficacy affect China’s ability to maneuver? Has Beijing had much luck in providing vaccines in exchange for political favors? Today on China Global, Bonnie Glaser digs deep into Beijing’s approach to vaccine diplomacy with Ivana Karásková, founder of MapInfluenCE and the organization China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe

Europe Signals Harder Line on Beijing with Frozen EU-China Trade Deal (RFE/RL; May 21, 2021)EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment: Milestones and Documents + China - International Partnerships (European Commission) China, Seeking a Friend in Europe Finds Rising Anger and Frustration (The New York Times, September 17, 2020)EU-China Cooperation on Climate Change (Euractiv, November 2020) EU Restricts Exports to Hong Kong over China Security Law (Deutsche Welle, July 28, 2020)

China’s rise has captivated and vexed the international community. From defense, technology, and the environment, to trade, academia, and human rights, much of what Beijing does now reverberates across the map. China Global is a new podcast from the German Marshall Fund that decodes Beijing’s global ambitions as they unfold. Every other week, host Bonnie Glaser will be joined by a different international expert for an illuminating discussion on a different aspect of China’s foreign policy, the worldview that drives its actions, the tactics it’s using to achieve its goals—and what that means for the rest of the world.